MILITARY LEADERSHIP:

THE EFFECT OF LEADER BEHAVIOR ON SOLDIER RETENTION IN

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

by

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Abstract

Leadership skills theory discusses those leadership behaviors and attributes that are necessary to be successful in attaining organizational goals. One of the most important goals that the Army National Guard (ARNG) has is to retain its soldiers. Retention in the Army National Guard (ARNG) is critical to the security of this nation. The Guard conducts operations both humanitarian and combat – both foreign and domestic – on a daily basis. Retaining those quality soldiers who are currently serving must be a significant focus of the service over the next several years. Without leadership emphasis, the Guard's retention rates could drop. Further, without the development of key leadership skills, retention rates may suffer. This study tested the relationship between leader skills and the intent of National Guard soldiers' to reenlist after a combat or humanitarian mobilization and deployment. The results were profound in that each of the 23 leadership skills tested was positively related to intent to reenlist. Further, each of these skills is trainable to both military and civilian leaders. Through judicious use of effective leadership skills, these commanders can positively affect the retention problem from within. By adjusting its leadership-training program, the ARNG may find itself reaping retention rewards for years to come.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Ronda, to whom I owe everything. Her love and support during this challenging period of our lives has meant the world to me. I would also like to dedicate this to my three girls, Hannah, Kayleigh, and Amanda. They are, without a doubt, the most amazing and wonderful children ever–I am sure this would be bourn out by the research.

There are many people whom I would like to thank. First and foremost is Dr. Jim Mirabella. I took his basic stats class while deployed to Qatar and Iraq. This in and of itself is testament to Capella University–but Dr. Mirabella stood out as an incredibly supportive professor who understood what it means to be a soldier. When Dr. John Whitlock recommended that I ask Dr. Mirabella to be my mentor, I jumped at the chance. Even though we have yet to meet face-to-face, the guidance and direction provided to me, those incredibly tough questions, the insights, even the simple comments he has made–each of these things has added up to a significantly improved product. I could not have asked for a better and more supportive dissertation chair than Dr. Mirabella. Sir, I salute you.

A very special person that I would like to thank is Dr. John Whitlock. I am so very appreciative of his guidance and counsel throughout this entire process. I was lucky enough to meet Dr. Whitlock, and his lovely wife, at my first colloquium in Phoenix; at that time, I had no idea who he was. We sat and talked for over an hour and I left so very impressed with the humble, helpful nature of this man. Since that time, every time I have sought his advice he has

Without her encouragement and confidence in my abilities, I would not have taken on this task, but her faith and friendship has guided me through. Thank you, Lisa, I salute you.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Problem

"Lead, follow, or get out of the way!" Soldiers in the United States Army have heard and probably spoken this phrase many times. It is a mantra to some, implying decisiveness and a willingness to either take charge or follow orders–two admirable military characteristics–but to others it is a reason to cringe. Regardless of how it makes a person react, this bold leader behavior is often the perception of military leadership. The question rises, however–is it the best option for the Army National Guard (ARNG) today?

Recruiting and retaining service members in the U.S. Armed Forces has become increasingly difficult in recent years (Associated Press, 2005, March 23) and academic research has found that leader behavior is related to employee retention in both civilian (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001; Kleinman, 2004; Lock, 2003;) and military studies (Bolton, 2002; Masi & Cooke, 2000). This study as well will seek to understand how leadership behavior relates to a soldiers' decision to reenlist; however, it will look specifically at Army National Guard soldiers; emphasizing the dual nature of their service–both civil and military. Further, this study focuses only on those Guard soldiers who have been mobilized in support of national military objectives.

Statement of the Problem

The Guard is facing a manning crisis. Recruitment of soldiers to serve in the Army as well as the Guard has become very difficult, partially due to the war in Iraq and in Afghanistan. With recruiting activities being so challenging, it becomes more and more important to retain

existing soldiers within the organization. Thus, Army Guard leaders must know if these behaviors relate to this critical issue of retention.

Background of the Study

Army National Guard

The ARNG is a military organization formed as one of the three components of the United States Army. It is one of the reserve components, along with the Army Reserve (USAR), and therefore is a part-time force. Consisting of approximately 350,000 members (Schultz, 2004), the Guard is a very large and complex military organization. The vast majority of its members, over 300,000, are civilians for most of their time and soldiers, traditionally, for one weekend each month and two weeks during the summer, during which time Guard soldiers are trained on their military skills. The remaining 50,000 serve in a full-time capacity. Obviously, this paradigm has shifted because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but is still principally how the Guard operates today. Members of the Reserve Components (RC), the ARNG and the USAR, as well as the RCs for the other services must constantly toggle between the two environments–being both citizen and soldier. This makes for a culture that is neither completely "military" nor completely "civilian" but a unique cross between the two.

The National Guard is, in actuality, an organization that consists of 54 state National Guard organizations–each fully "owned" by the Governor or principal leader. There is no national command of the Guard, only the National Guard Bureau in Washington, DC, which administers to the 54 entities and provides them resources. As our nation's only constitutionally based force, each of the 50 states is authorized a militia–the National Guard. In addition to these

50 states, the District of Columbia and three U.S. Territories–Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands–each has a National Guard as well. Guard units serve at the will of their Governor until federalized by the President. When this occurs, they become part of the Active Army until such time as they are released from this service. This process is called mobilization/demobilization.

Manning the Force

Filling the ranks of our voluntary military has not been a very difficult prospect until quite recently. The United States Army, in fact, has met its annual recruiting goals each year since 1999 and has achieved its monthly recruiting goals each month since May 2000 (Associated Press, 2005, March 23). In February 2005, however, this successful streak came to an end. It was at this time that the Army fell short of its monthly goal by 27% (Associated Press, 2005, March 23). Further, then Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey correctly anticipated that the Army would fall short of its March and April, 2005 goals; though he remained optimistic for achieving the annual goal, the Army failed to meet this annual recruiting mission as well.

In order to ensure that both recruiting and retention goals are maintained, the Army has initiated several marketing and incentive programs. The Army, as well as the Army National Guard, has sponsored NASCAR stock cars to expand its target audience. The Army has also invested substantial advertising dollars in various activities such as football and the rodeo circuit, all with the specific purpose of maintaining the all-volunteer force (Associated Press, 2004, November 26).

New education benefits and signing bonuses have been offered to troops since 9/11, and the Army has even increased the maximum age allowed for incoming recruits–from 34 to 39

years old (Liss, March 22, 2005) and then again from 39 to 42 (Associated Press, 2006, January

18). Additionally, the Army and the Guard have increased the total number of recruiters

(Associated Press, 2004, October 1) and legislators have applied pressure to colleges and

universities to allow recruiters on-campus (Associated Press, 2005, February 2). Many of these

changes stem not only from the war but from the fact that the Army National Guard failed to

meet its recruiting goal for 2004 (Associated Press, 2004, September 23). This was the first time

in recent history that one of the Army's components failed to recruit enough soldiers. Each of the

Army's components then failed to meet its 2005 goal as well (Associated Press, 2005, October

1).

Because recruiting has become such a challenge, it is crucial that the Army National

Guard focus more effort on retaining its existing soldiers. As good business sense dictates, it is

far more cost-effective for an organization to retain its current employees than to recruit new

ones. According to the Chief of Retention for the Army Guard, in 2005 the ARNG met its annual

retention goals, though not by much (G. Bliss, personal conversation, January 2006). The goal

was 82% retention and the service came in at 82.2%, meeting its goal by only 0.2%. Though this

is a positive development, getting closer to 15% turnover, an 85% retention rate, would help to

offset the shortages in new recruits by nearly 10,000. One possible way to increase retention

rates may be to focus on leadership.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this descriptive survey study was to test the skills theory of leadership to

determine if leadership behaviors of Army National Guard (ARNG) leaders are predictors of a

soldier's decision to reenlist. The independent variables were generally defined as those

behaviors that leaders exhibit in the form of specific skills. For the purposes of this study, they

included communication, morale, job satisfaction, and team building. The dependent variable

was generally defined as a soldier's intent to reenlist at the time he or she took the survey.

<center>Significance of the Study</center>

This study was important for three primary reasons. First, there are very few studies done

on leadership and/or retention within the ranks of the Army National Guard or any of the military

reserve components. Although some studies have been conducted on active military leadership

and retention, the reserve components have been mainly left out. The reason for this is probably

a simple lack of access to data or to the population. Most of the retention and leadership research

that is conducted only studies civilian organizations. Each military branch, the Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Marine Corps, commissions its own research, but not much of this research has been

released outside of those military channels. Additionally, this military research is typically

conducted only among active forces and therefore is only partially relevant to National Guard

and Reserve units.

The second reason why this study was important is the unique nature of the National

Guard soldier. A Guard member is both citizen and soldier–both civilian and military. It is, in

reality, quite easy for Guardsmen to get out of the military prior to the expiration of their service

obligation (called an expiration of term of service or ETS). The simple truth is that troops can

choose not to attend Unit Training Assemblies (UTA), which are commonly known as their drill

weekends, and, after missing nine such assemblies, they are discharged from the service.

Commanders can charge these soldiers as being absent without leave (AWOL), but because they are assets of their particular state–not the federal government–punishment varies from state to state. It is typical that commanders will discharge these AWOL soldiers rather than take the time to go through difficult legal proceedings; as stated earlier, most commanders have full-time civilian jobs and can only offer the Guard a few number of hours per week.

Third, it was important to conduct this study because the leadership training for ARNG leaders is based in Army doctrine. This is not necessarily a problem, but it needs to be determined how that doctrine–specifically leader behaviors within that doctrine–is related to Guard troops versus Active troops. It is unknown if Army leadership doctrine is fully applicable to Guard soldiers. The Guard may need a slight variant to the leadership it teaches due to the citizen-soldier nature of the organization. It may be that the Guard should emphasize certain aspects of the doctrine and deemphasize others.

Research Questions

This study sought to answer two research questions through a thorough review of the relevant literature. The research questions that were asked are as follows:

1. Which leader skills relate to ARNG soldier's decision to reenlist?

2. Do Army National Guard soldiers require leadership behaviors that are different from what is trained in standard Army leadership doctrine?

Definition of Terms

Army National Guard (ARNG). A reserve component of the Army. The ARNG is

primarily a State organization unless federalized by the President. There are 54 State and

Territory Army National Guard organizations throughout the country. Each state has one, as does

the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Army National Guard Directorate (ARNGD). The Army component of the National

Guard Bureau (NGB).

Active Component (AC). The U.S. Army's active component. The Army has three

components, one active and two reserve.

Annual Training (AT). The two-week training exercise conducted by the Army's reserve

components.

Attrition. When soldiers leave the organization prior to their contracted term of service.

Battalion. A military formation of approximately 700 soldiers organized around a

specific function such as infantry, combat engineer, medical, or transportation. Battalions are

usually part of brigades or regiments and have sub-organizations called companies.

Chain of command. The hierarchy within military organizations. Soldiers have

individuals who they report to–or are commanded by. This chain goes up to the Governor in the

National Guard or the President in the Active component or if the Guard unit is called to active

federal service.

Citizen-Soldier. A member of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. Can be in

either traditional or full-time status.

Company. A military formation of approximately 150 soldiers organized around a specific function such as infantry, combat engineer, medical, or transportation. Companies are usually part of battalions and have sub-organizations called platoons.

Command directed survey. A survey that is given to a National Guard unit with the expectation that all personnel participate. These surveys maintain anonymity of respondents and it is up to the unit commander if his or her unit participates.

Demobilization stations. Military posts or facilities where soldiers recently returning from combat pass through for administrative procedures prior to being sent home and deactivated from the Army.

Department of the Army (DA). The federal organization, headed by the Secretary of the Army, which administers the United States Army.

Department of Defense (DoD). The federal cabinet level organization, headed by the Secretary of Defense, which administers the United States Armed Forces.

Director, Army National Guard (DARNG). The three-star general who is in charge of the Army National Guard Directorate of the National Guard Bureau.

Doctrine. "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application" (FM 101-5-1, 1997, p. 1-55).

Drill weekend. The weekend training assembly for a reservist or Guardsman. This is a slang term for Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA).

Expiration of Term of Service (ETS). The date when a soldier's service agreement or contract expires. An ETS date is a critical decision point for a soldier whether or not to reenlist.

Family Readiness Group (FRG). Also known as a Family Readiness Program, this is the group of family members who organize within a unit to ensure that member's families are taken care of when the need occurs, to include mobilization and/or deployment.

Force Structure (FS). This refers to the positions or units available in a military organization. Force structure is how the capabilities of the force are allocated. The structure is typically allocated to the Army in forms of divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies.

Forward Operating Base (FOB)–The bases from which American soldiers operate from in Iraq and Afghanistan. These bases are fenced, gated, and relatively secure.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)–A weapon currently used by the Iraqi insurgent effort. The IED is a roadside bomb that is made from old ordinance and ammunition. Enemy combatants create an explosive device and hide it in common roadside items such as foliage, trash, and even animal carcasses. The IED is remotely detonated when a Coalition target is within the kill zone.

Mobilization. The act of reserve components being called to active duty. There are several different types of mobilization and it can be done at the State level or Federal level for National Guard soldiers.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR). MWR is organized activity for the purpose of improving morale in a military unit.

National Guard (NG). The constitutionally based military force of each state in the U.S. consisting of the Army and Air National Guard. They are commanded by the Governor and the highest ranking military officer is the Adjutant General, a two-star general officer. The NG is a State organization unless federalized by the President. There are 54 State and Territory National

Guard organizations throughout the country. Each state has one, as does the District of

Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

National Guard Bureau (NGB). The organization charged with oversight and resourcing

responsibilities of the Army and Air National Guard. It is headquartered in Washington, DC.

Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). Senior enlisted soldiers who are designated as

military leaders. NCOs hold the ranks of Corporal, Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Sergeant First Class,

Master or First Sergeant, and Sergeant Major.

Platoon. A military formation of approximately 40 soldiers organized around a specific

function such and infantry, combat engineer, medical, or transportation. Squads are usually part

of companies and have sub-organizations called teams.

Reenlist. The process by which a soldier chooses to extend his or her enlistment service

obligation for a specific period of time often for three to six years. This is the individual soldier's

decision, not a decision of his or her command.

Reserve Component (RC). The reserve organizations from the five armed services–Army,

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. There are seven reserve components–the

Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the

Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.

Traditional Guardsman. Also referred to as a M-day, or man-day soldier who participates

in weekend drills as well as the two-week annual training. They are not full-time or active duty

soldiers.

Unit. Typically a unit is a company level organization. Such will be the case for this

paper.

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). One of the Army's two reserve components. The other is the Army National Guard.

Nature of the Study

This quantitative, post-hoc study was descriptive in nature. It comprised a systematic analysis of leadership behaviors (skills and attributes) as they relate to Army National Guard retention.

Research Design

In order to achieve the stated purpose of this study, the Post-Mobilization survey located in Appendix A was used. Because this was a descriptive study, all participants received the same instrument. The questions asked in the survey were operationalized so as to provide relevant data to answer the research questions and/or the hypotheses of this study. The study consisted of one dependent variable–the soldiers' intent to reenlist. The independent variables in the study were the operationalized leadership skills, to include communication, morale, job satisfaction, and team building.

Sampling

The population for this study consisted of approximately 73,714 ARNG soldiers mobilized from July 2003 to December 2005; this study is based on 26,250 respondents from various units throughout the ARNG. National Guard Bureau offered the survey to unit commanders through command channels and commanders either elected to administer it or not administer it to their organization. In Army National Guard vernacular, this is referred to as a "command directed" survey. Many commanders want to know the climate of their organization

and therefore offer the survey to their units. Others are directed by their own commanders to offer the survey.

Data Collection

The survey was available to Guard commanders at the company level–typically about 100-150 soldiers. If a commander chose to administer the survey, all of the soldiers in the unit who are present for duty at the mobilization station were given the opportunity to take the survey. Soldiers were not forced to take the survey, though it was strongly recommended. Although this survey is not random, it is representative of the entire nation. Participants from every state and territory have participated in the survey.

Data Analysis

As previously mentioned, the dependent variable was *intent to reenlist*. This variable was measured as nominal data. The independent variables represent ordinal data. Because both nominal and ordinal data do not have interval data characteristics, non-parametric tests were conducted. Thus, to measure the relationship between it and the leadership behaviors, Chi Square tests were used. Although a Chi Square test is used primarily to measure nominal data, it is also useful when measuring the strength of relationships between nominal and ordinal data (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). To reduce prediction errors, the Lambda coefficient and Goodman and Kruskal's tau were calculated.

Theoretical Framework

Leadership Skills Theory

The theoretical framework of this study was based upon leadership skills theory, which uses the leadership skills model developed by Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, and Fleishman (2000). Current Army leadership doctrine is based in the skills theory of leadership (Campbell & Dardis, 2004).

The skills model is "a capability model for understanding leader performance in organizational settings, considering both skill and knowledge requirements, as well as the development and expression of those capabilities over the course of leaders' careers" (Mumford et al., 2000d, p. 12). This theory indicates that by increasing leader skill and knowledge, leaders perform at higher levels and thus are more effective. It also establishes a need to continue to develop leaders at all levels. As applied to this study, it was expected that the independent variables (leadership skills) would be related to the dependent variable (soldier intent to reenlist) because, by having high levels of leadership skills, soldiers will want to continue to serve that leader.

Assumptions and Limitations

There are several assumptions and limitations associated with this study.

Assumptions

It was assumed that the decision of a soldier to reenlist is intensely personal and intimate in nature. Leaders develop relationships with their soldiers and, at the time of the decision to reenlist, it was assumed that the specific leader would be able to influence his or her soldier

through word and deed. Soldiers consider many things, including leadership, when making this decision but, it was assumed that a myriad of issues–including life and death–influence a troop's choice to stay in the National Guard.

It was assumed that the soldiers answering the survey are doing so honestly. This is a common assumption in all social research–but within this military context, it extends to even greater levels of importance. There is significant pressure on soldiers to reenlist, and if they were to come forward and announce that their intent was to leave the service, they could be treated poorly by their peers and superiors. The survey is conducted with participant autonomy in mind and each respondent is assured privacy. Answers are recorded on a Scantron-type form that allows for a feeling of privacy as well. Based upon these reasons, it is safe to assume that the soldiers will answer the survey questions honestly.

It was assumed that the surveys are all properly administered and within the guidelines set forth by National Guard Bureau and the developers of the instrument. Because the author of this paper did not administer the product, he could only rely on field reports as to how well the procedures were adhered to. However, this assumption is not of significant concern because the procedures were very simple and those who did administer the survey at the unit level had done many of these in the past. NGB conducts several surveys annually to its force and the administers are typically very adept at following instructions. Based upon these facts, it was safe to assume that the survey was administered properly.

It was assumed that the instrument is valid. The developer conducted several pilot surveys prior to releasing this, and the survey itself is based upon feedback from a previous NGB

survey (the Post-Mobilization survey) of over 26,000 respondents. Based upon these to facts, it is fair to assume that the survey was valid.

The fact that the sample was not random was assumed irrelevant since over one-third of the population was included, and the choice of a commander not to participate was independent of the individual enlistees' decision to reenlist. Thus, it was assumed that this very large sample was representative of the population with minimal sampling error.

Limitations

This study was limited primarily by the fact that it utilizes secondary data. This limitation was not severe, however, because the Post-Mobilization survey asked questions that were easily operationalized to answer the research questions addressed in this study. Thus, this limitation should was easily overcome.

Organization of the Remainder of the Study

The following chapter contains a review of the relevant literature. Topics covered include (a) a review of Army leadership doctrine to ensure that the reader understands the leadership foundations and training provided to Army National Guard soldiers; (b) an overview of leadership skills theory to place that doctrine and this study in its theoretical context; (c) a review of the primary leader behaviors that will be studied to include communication, job-satisfaction, team-building, and morale building theories; (d) a discussion of employee turnover among both the civilian and military sectors; and (e) a discussion of those specific factors that make retention in the Army National Guard and other reserve components a unique problem–such as family and employer issues.

Chapter 3 discusses methodology in a very detailed manner, to include how the survey instrument was developed, how it was administered, how data were collected, and how it was analyzed. Chapter 4 presents the results of the data and chapter 5 offers conclusions and recommendations based on analyses.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the recent literature surrounding the theoretical framework of the proposed study as well as other defining characteristics of the study. This framework, as discussed, is leadership skills theory. Other important areas include an overview of Army doctrine and the relevant literature that supports the four primary skills being studied: communication, job satisfaction, team building, and morale building. The recent retention literature is reviewed, as are two issues that are important to retention in the National Guard: family support and employer support.

Army Leadership Doctrine

Although the leadership doctrine of the U.S. Army is not academic in nature, an understanding of how the target population is trained in leadership and how soldiers are expected to act in a given leadership situation is critical to understanding this paper. Therefore, a comprehensive review of this leadership doctrine is presented.

Doctrine

The Army defines doctrine as "Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application" (FM 101-5-1, 1997, p. 1-55). With regard to this paper, the latter sentence of this definition is critical. Doctrine is not a lawful order that must be carried out by commanders it is only guidance. Leaders are required to exercise judgment in order to apply such guidance successfully. The same applies to leadership doctrine. Though the Army strongly recommends particular methods, it is up to the leaders themselves to determine exactly how they

will lead. The Army provides its leadership doctrine and trains soldiers on the process it

recommends, but will not dictate specific a leadership style to commanders.

Army Leadership

The Army reflects the importance of three main areas of focus in its definition of

leadership: "Leadership is *influencing* people—by providing purpose, direction, and

motivation—while *operating* to accomplish the mission and *improving* the organization" (FM

22-100, 1999, p. 1-4). The three actions involved are influencing, operating, and improving.

Leaders in today's Army work to better themselves and their subordinate leaders in these areas.

Figure 1 captures the interrelation of these actions in the construct of the "Be, Know, Do"

leadership framework.

Figure 1, *The Army leadership model, "Be, Know, Do" (FM 22-100, 1999, p. 1-3).*

"Be, Know, Do" explained.

The Army leadership model uses a "building block" approach with the foundation being the "be" component consisting of the Army values and the leader attributes. This first area asks leaders to internalize the values and attributes–to "be" them. These values should be automatic–leaders should not have to think but immediately react under their guidance every time.

The Army has developed seven Army Values around the acronym LDRSHIP. Clearly, the service is making a point that the value system it wishes to instill is based primarily upon leadership. These seven values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Below are these values as defined in FM22-100 and expounded upon by the U.S. Army's Corps of Discovery Web site (2005):

1. Loyalty-Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. constitution, the Army, and other soldiers. Be loyal to the nation and its heritage.

2. Duty-Fulfill your obligations. Accept responsibility for your own actions and those entrusted to your care. Find opportunities to improve oneself for the good of the group.

3. Respect-Rely upon the golden rule. How we consider others reflects upon each of us, both personally and as a professional organization.

4. Selfless Service-Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own. Selfless service leads to organizational teamwork and encompasses discipline, self-control and faith in the system.

5. Honor. Live up to all the Army values.

6. Integrity. Do what is right, legally and morally. Be willing to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is our "moral compass" and inner voice.

7. Personal Courage-Our ability to face fear, danger, or adversity, both physical and moral courage.

These values provide a foundation from which to begin training soldiers to become better leaders. By instilling value-based characteristics, the Army will have some assurance that the leaders they develop will grow into ethical soldiers and will have a lower risk of abusing the power given to them.

The leader attributes that represent the second portion of the "be" are mental, physical, and emotional. The mental attributes include will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness. FM 22-100 defines each as follows:

1. Will–Will is the inner drive that compels soldiers and leaders to keep going when they are exhausted, hungry, afraid, cold, and wet-when it would be easier to quit.

2. Self-discipline–Self-disciplined people are masters of their impulses. This mastery comes from the habit of doing the right thing.

3. Initiative–Initiative is the ability to be a self-starter-to act when there are no clear instructions, to act when the situation changes or when the plan falls apart.

4. Judgment–Good judgment means making the best decision for the situation. It is a key attribute of the art of command and the transformation of knowledge into understanding.

5. Self-confidence–Self-confidence is the faith that you will act correctly and properly in any situation, even one in which you are under stress and do not have all the information you want.

6. Intelligence–Intelligent leaders think, learn, and reflect; then they apply what they learn.

7. Cultural awareness–Culture is a group's shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions about what is important. As an Army leader, you must be aware of cultural factors.

The physical attributes are health fitness, physical fitness, and military and professional bearing. The emotional attributes are self-control, balance, and stability. FM 22-100 defines each as follows:

1. Health fitness–Health fitness is everything you do to maintain good health, including things such as undergoing routine physical exams, practicing good dental hygiene, maintaining deployability standards, and even personal grooming and cleanliness.

2. Physical fitness–Unit readiness begins with physically fit soldiers and leaders. Combat drains soldiers physically, mentally, and emotionally. To minimize those effects, Army leaders are physically fit, and they make sure their subordinates are fit as well.

3. Military and professional bearing–As an Army leader, you are expected to look like a soldier. Know how to wear the uniform and wear it with pride at all times. Meet height and weight standards. By the way you carry yourself and through your military courtesy and appearance, you send a signal: I am proud of my uniform, my unit, and myself.

4. Self-control-Leaders control their emotions.

5. Balance–Emotionally balanced leaders display the right emotion for the situation and can also read others' emotional state.

6. Stability–Effective leaders are steady, levelheaded under pressure and fatigue, and calm in the face of danger.

By incorporating these attributes as well as the Army values, the Army believes soldiers will have a solid foundation from which to begin making appropriate and ethical decisions.

The "know" portion of the model asks that soldiers understand the more academic and professional aspects of their chosen career: the leader skills of interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. The following is excerpted from FM 22-100 (1999) and describes these skills:

> Interpersonal skills affect how you deal with people. They include coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating, and empowering. Conceptual skills enable you to handle ideas. They require sound judgment as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, critically, and ethically. Technical skills are job-related abilities. They include basic soldier skills. As an Army leader, you must possess the expertise necessary to accomplish all tasks and functions you're assigned. Tactical skills apply to solving tactical problems, that is, problems concerning employment of units in combat. You enhance tactical skills when you combine them with interpersonal, conceptual, and technical skills to accomplish a mission. (sec. 2, p. 25)

The final component of the Army's leadership model is the "do." It consists of three leadership actions: influencing, operating, and improving. Each of these actions has three corresponding leader skills that leaders must incorporate. The influencing actions of communicating, decision-making, and motivating represent how the Army evaluates whether leaders are successfully influencing people. The operating actions include planning, executing, and assessing and deal with carrying out tasks or missions. Finally, the improving actions of

developing, building (team and climate), and learning involve creating an environment of increased success for one's self and one's subordinates.

Campbell and Dardis (2004) discuss the traditional method the Army implements to train leaders. Their article, which discusses the Army's "Be, Know, Do" model, advocates its use outside a military environment. They argue that because "Be, Know, Do" is grounded in solid academic rigor and demonstrated through application by the Army for many years, it would be an effective model for any organization.

The Army leadership doctrine, however, is not considered by all to be a perfect solution, and many researchers find it lacking for a variety of reasons. Paparone (2004) suggests that the Army should change its "Be, Know, Do" model of leadership to "be, learn, do." He offers that leaders who think they "know" are ineffective and that the learning process is continuous. He finds that the model is lacking because it fails to meet an academic standard and is entirely too broad for effective implementation. Varljen (2003) believes that it is important for leadership doctrine to change. Varljen believes that though FM 22-100 appears to be broad, it implicitly focuses leaders only on successful mission accomplishment. He argues that it must also emphasize skills that are important as opposed to just the successful accomplishment of tactical missions.

Leadership Skills Theory

The Army leadership doctrine is grounded in the skills theory of leadership outlined by Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, and Fleishman, (2000d). It was derived from the works of Katz (1955) and further developed by Mumford and his colleagues. Significant progress was

made on this model in the late 1990s and early 2000s at which time a significant study of over

1,800 military officers was conducted on behalf of the U.S. Army. It is from the results of this

study that the "Be, Know, Do" model and the skills model are derived.

Definition

Leadership skills theory developed into a workable model of leadership. It is "a capability

model for understanding leader performance in organizational settings, considering both skill and

knowledge requirements, as well as the development and expression of those capabilities over

the course of leaders' careers" (Mumford et al., 2000d, p. 12). The model's focus is on

increasing skill and knowledge to develop effective leaders; it also establishes a need to continue

to develop leaders at all levels (Beam, 1996; Connelly, Gilbert, Zaccaro, Threlfall, Marks, &

Mumford, 2000; Mumford, Dansereau, & Yammarino, 2000a; Mumford, Marks, Connelly,

Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000b; Mumford, O'Connor, Clifton, Connelly, & Zaccaro, 1993; M.

D. Mumford, Zaccaro, Connelly, & Marks, 2000c; Mumford et al., 2000d; Mumford, Zaccaro,

Johnson, Diana, Gilbert, & Threlfall, 2000e; Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2003; Pernick,

2001; Zaccaro, Mumford, Connelly, Marks, & Gilbert, 2000).

Beyond the work of Mumford and his colleagues, there has been limited research

conducted on the theory. Hence, the majority of this review will be derived from Mumford's

work over the past decade. This study will further leadership skills theory by extending this

stream of research. Because the Army has used this model to train its leaders for the several

years leading up to the Global War on Terror, it is now possible to study actual wartime results

of the model. This research project will do that.

Skills

A leader in an organization must be capable of solving problems. This includes not only implementing existing systems to fix routine problems, but also creatively developing and exercising viable solutions to complex, novel problems (Mumford et al., 2000d). Meeting the needs of this leadership requirement necessitates specific skills. Mumford and his colleagues offer three such skill sets: problem solving, social judgment, and social skills.

Problem solving skills. Problem solving skills include, as argued by Mumford et al. (2000d), identifying the problem, understanding what the problem is and how it is affecting the organization, and identifying solutions to the problem. These skills are critical to being able to solve organizational problems creatively. Further, Mumford et al. indicate that these skills are all trainable among young leaders and grow as leaders' knowledge and experience increase.

Social judgment skills. Social judgment skills are needed because the problems leaders encounter will be in a primarily social context. Thus, Mumford and his colleagues argue the need for leaders to have good social judgment skills. Several such skills have been identified; all seem to be related to wisdom. These skills include self-objectivity, self-reflection, systems perception, awareness of solution fit, judgment under uncertain conditions, and systems commitment (Mumford et al., 2000d). Additionally, "identification of restrictions, analysis of downstream consequences, coordination of multiple activities, and sensitivity to relevant goals" (Mumford et al., 2000d, p. 19) are some of the skills necessary for leaders to portray good judgment.

Social skills. General social skills are also necessary to motivate subordinates to work together to implement the leaders' intended solution. These skills, Mumford and his colleagues

argue, include marshalling support, communicating, guiding subordinates, motivating others, social perceptiveness, behavioral flexibility, persuasion, negotiation, conflict management, and coaching. Leaders must be able to get along with others, work with others, and ensure that others are able to perform at the necessary levels.

Knowledge

Having the necessary skills is only one portion of the model. "Knowledge reflects a schematic organization of key facts and principles pertaining to the characteristics of objects lying in a domain" (Mumford et al., 2000d, p. 20). Thus, knowledge is not simply an understanding of various data, but it is an overarching understanding of the organization, the functions of the organization, and the means by which decisions are made and implemented within the organization. Leaders must have knowledge about the specific tasks performed within their domain as well. They need not be experts, but a solid understanding of what subordinates do–and what superiors expect–is imperative.

Leader Development

Both skills and knowledge develop over time. As leaders gain experience, they are able to become more successful. Skills such as those described earlier are not immediately developed. Ericsson and Charness (1994, as cited in Mumford et al., 2000d) posit that it could take ten years to develop the necessary skills to function at the highest echelons of a particular career field. This infers that training and development of these skills are critical to the success and speed at which leaders develop (Mumford et al., 2000b; Pernick, 2001). The skills model includes a strong component of developing leaders in skills and knowledge, thus allowing them to perform with increasing effectiveness throughout their tenure.

Summary

The skills model approaches leadership in a building-block fashion. It is leader-centered and focuses on describing the specific attributes and knowledge necessary for leaders to be effective. Because it is "descriptive," as opposed to "normative" or "prescriptive," the model can be taught to large groups of people, clearly an appealing aspect to developing military leaders. Northouse (2004) articulates several strengths and weaknesses of the skills model. The following is a summary of his observations.

Strengths. The skills model is leader-centered versus follower-centered. The abilities of leaders, based upon the skills that they learn and the knowledge they acquire are what make them effective. Thus, through the skills approach, leadership is available to anyone who desires to learn it. Following the recommendations outlined by Mumford et al. (2000d), a prospective leader can obtain the necessary skills over time. This model also provides researchers with metrics with which to study and evaluate successful leadership. The model is highly trainable. It is structured in such a way to ensure that leader development programs can be easily created, as was done by the U.S. Army.

Weaknesses. The first weakness of the model is that it is very broad, extending beyond the scope of leadership to include many other fields such as motivation theory, organizational behavior, and communication theory. "The skills model is weak in predictive value" (Northouse, 2004, p. 63). It states that leader productivity is increased yet does not explain how the skills and knowledge actually improve performance. Finally, the model was constructed using only

military personnel as subjects. It must be tested within other organizations such as businesses–both large and small–to be fully accepted as a viable model of leadership.

Overall, the skills model is valuable within the military context. It continues to be refined as Army leaders and academic researchers continue to observe its effects. Of particular interest, and in need of further study, is how well the model works during the wartime military. This study will further examine the theoretical framework of the leadership skills theory among Guard soldiers recently returning from a mobilization and will therefore continue moving the research forward.

Leadership Behaviors and Skills

There are dozens of leadership behaviors and/or leadership skills that are recognized by the Army as well as by academic researchers. This study will consider and test the relationship between four–communication, job satisfaction, team building, and morale building–and in relation to a Guard soldier's decision to reenlist.

Communication Theory

Overview. The necessity for military leaders to effectively communicate cannot be understated–whether during combat or peacetime (Popper, 1996). Communication plays a vital role within every organization (Lundberg & Brownell, 1993). The methods people use to communicate with both external and internal stakeholders are all part of this growing field of research. The theoretical underpinnings of organizational communication are eclectic. Input has come from many fields, including engineering, business, and psychology. These fields have, over the last several decades, begun to meld into a single, robust research area. Further, this

interdisciplinary perspective has become explicitly disciplinary and "speaks volumes about the coming of age of the field" (Taylor, 2002, p. 484).

Still, as Lundberg and Brownell (1993) point out, there is a lack of a widely accepted definition of organizational communication. This is due to the dispersed nature of the field, which captures from the disciplines of organizational theory, public relations, discourse analysis, critical writing, sociology, social psychology, and technology (Taylor, 2002). Rather than delving into this argument, however, Pace and Faules (1994) offer a functional definition that is appropriate for this paper: "Organizational communication may be defined as the display and interpretation of messages among communication units that are part of a particular organization" (p. 21). As such, people within organizations communicate in a number of ways and among a number of channels.

Because of the diversified nature of the research, multiple theories exist to explain how communication takes place within an organization. Krone, Jablin, and Putnam (1987), cited in (Jablin, Putnam, Roberts, & Lyman, 1987) offer a workable breakdown of the theory. These researchers describe two key concepts that are fundamental to organizational communication. First, they offer four perspectives on the study of human communication: mechanistic, psychological, interpretive-symbolic, and systems-interaction. The mechanistic perspective is one of transmission. The message travels from one point to another; the emphasis is on the communication channel. The psychological perspective considers how the people involved affect communication. This perspective looks primarily at how individuals filter the information input since, due to the sheer volume, it is impossible to process all of it. The interpretive-symbolic perspective looks at the effect of the organizational characteristics on communication. With both

the mechanistic and psychological communication views, the communication is shaped by the organization. "Organizational properties are assumed to determine communication process to a greater extent than communication processes are thought to shape the organizational characteristics" (Jablin et al., 1987, p. 27). When looked at from an interpretive-symbolic perspective, on the other hand, the individuals have the power to shape the communication and are capable of "creating and shaping their own social reality" (Jablin et al., 1987, p. 27). Finally, the systems-interaction approach focuses primarily on external behaviors. The overarching theme is that there are patterns of communication behaviors existing within the system. These patterns recur and change gradually over time. The systems-interaction approach places strong emphasis on culture as it relates to an organization.

The second key concept Krone et al. (1987) offer is their explanation of the basic flow of communication: message, channel, sender/receiver, transmission, encoding/decoding, meaning, feedback, and communication effects. Along each step, there is the potential for individuals within organizations to affect the information as it moves. Regardless of the approach, Krone et al. (1987) posit that the basic pattern of communication stays consistent.

Another pervasive theme among these bodies of research is the focus on internal relationship building. Looking through an even narrower lens, it is evident that internal public relations management serves as a key component in the communication skill set required by leaders. Internal publics (e.g., employees) are one of an organization's most significant stakeholders. They represent one of an organization's most valuable assets: its "human capital." The military is no exception. In fact, some may argue that within this particular profession, personnel *are* the principal stakeholders. Without soldiers, there would be no military.

As discussed by Randall and Fall (2005), in an internal relations construct, the study of two-way symmetrical communication and the shift toward a dialogical approach that focuses upon the building of relationships is gaining momentum by numerous scholars in the communication field (Botan, 1997; Botan & Hazelton, 1989; Broom, Casey & Ritchey, 1997; Bruning, 2002; Cameron & McCollum, 1993; Grunig, 1992; Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Heath, 2001; Kent & Taylor, 2002; Ledingham, 2003; Ledingham & Bruning, 2000; Pearson, 1989; Taylor, 2000). Since communication is one of the independent variables examined in this study, the research contained within extends the dialogical theoretical framework, which is conducive to effective internal relationship management and to the enhancement of overall employee retention.

Army National Guard communication. With regard to organizational communication within a military context, the common belief might be that a mechanistic approach is often taken. This is true in many instances but certainly not true overall. The hierarchical nature of the Army National Guard offers simple, natural communication channels for upward and downward flow of information–as is evident in the mechanistic construct. There is a significant amount of horizontal communication, however, in the military, as there is in any organization (Pace & Faules, 1994).

The Army doctrine addresses the importance of engaging in internal relations practices to include two-way communication. "The two-way concept emphasizes communications exchange, reciprocity, and mutual understanding" (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000, p. 4). Thus, Guard leaders must possess significant communication skills. They must be able to develop two-way communication and ensure that everyone understands the mission or orders given. Although

these leaders should have the skills to do this, they must also know when to foster this

communication and when not to. The military provides a setting that poses unique

communication challenges due to operational security needs inherent in combat missions. This

causes an ethical dilemma for Guard leaders; they need to know how to best handle the

communication in a given situation. By making an inappropriate communication decision,

leaders may inadvertently cause additional ethical problems within their unit. Creating an ethical

organizational climate is linked to the communication skills of the leader (Clutterback & Hirst,

2002; Grunig, 1993; Petti Jr., Vaught, & Pulley, 1990).

  Communication Ethics. Beckett (2003) argues that because of the nature and speed of

current communication, leaders must consider the ethical implications at every level prior to the

dissemination of information. He states that the importance of communication ethics is

significant to organizational and interpersonal communications behaviors. Ethics strategies,

Beckett maintains, can be easily implemented through communication strategy. This

communications strategy affects every aspect of the organization.

  Kelly (1990) contends that the leader of an organization is the one who develops the

ethical strategy and agrees that the implementation of ethics is through communication

behaviors. Ethical communication, he points out, should be a dialogical, ongoing, two-way

communication process. Thus, if an Army leader wanted to encourage ethical behaviors, he/she

would have to set the ethical tone him/herself by engaging in two-way communication.

  Understanding that leaders possess the responsibility to create an ethical environment in

their respective organizations is important to the underpinnings of this paper. The leader frames

the organizational climate; and as the Ruppel and Harrington (2000) study found, a relationship

exists between ethical work climate and skillful communication. They also found support for the

relationship between communication and trust. Good leadership communication can create an

ethical organizational environment.

One means by which leaders can engage in ethical communication is to share

information. Ethical practices and openness to communication are important to management

survival (Nelson, 2003). Verschoor (2000) adds that it is important for military leaders to issue

lawful orders, but they must also be willing to listen and communicate with subordinates if there

is a misunderstanding. He maintains that good leaders must be willing to provide soldiers with

opportunities to ask questions and discuss problems; by doing so, these open communication

channels will be ethically sound and morale will be improved.

Wells and Spinks (1996) contend that ethical communication is crucial to high morale

and productivity among employees. High morale, particularly high unit morale among military

organizations, is something leaders strive to achieve, and communication is one method of

reaching this goal.

As discussed, there is significant support for the idea that military leaders are doing the

"right thing" and being ethical when they engage in two-way communication practices with their

subordinates and share information with the public. There is clearly an element of truth to this

philosophy, but there may be instances when these types of communication are, in fact, not

ethical. Stated another way, the greater good is often served when certain information is withheld

rather than shared–especially within a military environment.

Classified information. Much information within the military construct is considered

"classified." Sharing this information with unauthorized persons is highly unethical as the greater

need is to withhold this information. Giving away confidential, classified information could

compromise the combat missions at hand. Leaks to the press and to enemy agents could quickly

result in the unauthorized release of classified information. This practice is strongly dissuaded in

the Army through stringent laws and regulations (Verschoor, 2000).

The need to know. Soldiers understand the rules of having certain information withheld.

They simply do not expect to know or to be told everything and as such, unit morale is not

typically affected by not communicating classified information. Only when information that

could and should be shared is withheld do the problems begin (Snider, 2003). Commanders must

feel comfortable with sharing as much information as is legal and feasible. "Keep the troops in

the loop" would be a good motto for many unit commanders.

Public information. There have been many discussions about the Army's embedding of

reporters within their operations (Hauck, 2005; Jackson & Stanfield, 2004; Strupp & Berman,

2003). The debate on this topic centers on the question of ethics. Is it best to share or hide

information that is learned by these reporters? Where would the reporters' loyalties lie–in

journalism or in patriotism? Should journalists be put in a position in which they may feel

compelled to divulge sensitive information? These and other issues continue to go unanswered,

though they are very important to communication ethics.

Job Satisfaction

Job satisfaction is an area that has been researched and studied in great depth over the

past several decades (Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001; Kini & Hobson, 2002; Lakhani,

1988; Levin & Kleiner, 1992; Murray, 2003; Reinharth & Wahba, 1975; Scott & Taylor, 1985;

Vallen, 1993). Much of the research in job satisfaction is grounded in motivational theories with

significant attention being placed on Hertzberg's Two-Factor Theory (Brenner, Carmack, &

Weinstein, 1971; Elangovan & Xie, 1999; Guba, 1958; Gunnar Vaughn, 2003; Herzberg, 1974;

House & Wigdor, 1967; Kass et al., 2001; Motowidlo & Borman, 1978; Scott & Taylor, 1985;

Waters & Roach, 1971; Wiley, 1997). The typical application of this theory uses Hertzberg's

motivators (bonuses, perks, flexible hours, parking) and the hygiene factors (salary, office space,

appropriate work environment) to determine levels of job satisfaction. The results of these

studies show that job satisfaction has a direct linkage to the willingness of an employee to stay at

his or her place of employment.

Among the many studies published, Gunnar-Vaughn (2003) recommends pursuing a

program that enhances the job satisfaction motivators. She focuses on giving professional nurses

opportunities to enhance their education by recommending that employers offer classes on a

regular basis. By offering incentives that increase the nurses' education and professional

standing, leaders are able to directly affect job satisfaction. She adds that professionals seek

status, "including autonomy, workplace involvement, and collaboration" (p. 12). By enhancing

the perceived status of the nurses, she found that there was an increase in job satisfaction.

Finally, she argues that a professional needs a sense of recognition and achievement. She sums

her point by stating, "with or without a plentiful budget, managers can creatively develop

motivators that give nurses the recognition they seek" (2003, p. 13).

Providing incentives to improve organizational retention with extrinsic motivators is not

the focus of this study, but it is important to acknowledge their value. These incentives typically

represent organizational policy-handouts that the leaders must capitalize upon but do not have

much influence over. This is particularly true in the military, where much has been written about

providing incentives to increase job satisfaction (Caldera, 2002; Lakhani, 1988; Mehay & Hogan, 1998; " Reservist health benefits," 2003). These authors conclude that providing such incentives are critical to improving both recruiting and retention in military organizations.

National Guard job satisfaction. Military leaders must focus on increasing job satisfaction. This is of particular importance with regard to ARNG leaders. Due to the length of time between drills, Guard members have the ability to cause significant problems among their units if they are not satisfied. For example, if a soldier is highly dissatisfied at his drill weekend in February–and his leaders do not quell this dissatisfaction during that time–the leaders will have to wait until March. The unit leaders have only had two days (or less) in all of February to identify the problem, develop and implement a solution, and have that solution satisfy the soldier. If leaders are unable to accomplish all of these complex tasks, the problem could linger and fester for a full month. Then, in March, they have only two days again. It is easy to understand why a problem that should take only a few days in an active unit could take several months to resolve in a Guard unit. Thus, Guard leaders must have the skills necessary to identify and resolve issues of job satisfaction quickly and effectively.

Team Building

Building teams is almost cliché in organizations today (Taylor, 2004; Zaleznik, 1990). These activities, much like developing corporate/unit vision and mission statements, are simply eyewash for executives and general officers alike. Team-building exercises, workshops, and off-sites are conducted, yet little changes. There is a significant rhetoric surrounding the concept of building teams, yet because it is simply that–rhetoric–there are few examples of tangible evidence that these programs work when implemented at the corporate level (Parris & Vickers,

2005). Team building must be wrested from the hands of policy makers and inserted into the skill set of first line leaders (Eriksen, 2001; Marquardt, 2000). Only when implemented at a personal level–face to face, comrade to comrade–can those glorified, rhetorical benefits of teamwork be seen (Paris and Vickers, 2005).

National Guard team building. Team building in the armed forces is similar to that in the civilian sector, though it is potentially easier to accomplish because of the strict hierarchy and the tradition of unit esprit de corps. Military units are broken into platoons, squads, and teams. Inherent in the culture is unit pride and a "bonding" among the soldiers who are part of it. This makes the job of team building easier, though no less important. Further, team building is very important to military retention because, as cohesion increases, so does a willingness on the part of soldiers to stay (Griffith, 1988). Brown (2003) sees team building as the next major revolution in Army leader development. Developing those skills in National Guard leaders is paramount to a successful retention strategy. However, those skills are interpersonal in nature (Eriksen, 2001).

Morale Building

There are many foci within the stream of morale building literature. Some look at the ethical approach of morale building (Dickson, Smith, Grojean, & Ehrhart, 2001; Metzger & Dalton, 1996; Sonenshein, 2005; Wicks, 2001) while others see morale as a function of motivation (Britt, 2003; Cunningham, 2005; Griffith, 1988; Kini & Hobson, 2002; Mani, 2002; Motowidlo & Borman, 1978). Still others link morale to organizational culture (Metzger & Dalton, 1996; Pernick, 2001; Sonenshein, 2005; Swain & Schubot, 2004). This paper, however, will focus on morale building as a part of leadership but will include many of these other perspectives.

Many researchers conclude that improving morale is the task of the leader (Cunningham, 2005; Dhar & Mishra, 2001; Dickson et al., 2001; Johnson & Bledsoe, 1973; Jones, 2005; Kini & Hobson, 2002; Locander & Luechauer, 2005; Meese, 2002; Pernick, 2001; Rosenbaum & Rosenbatjm, 1971; Van Dierendonck, Haynes, Borrill, & Stride, 2004; Vowler, 2005; Yuspeh, 2002). Further, there is significant consensus among academic research that high morale is central to retaining employees (Baird & Bradley, 1978; Britt, 2003; Dickson et al., 2001; Guba, 1958; Kini & Hobson, 2002; Motowidlo & Borman, 1978). Thus, having the leadership skills to improve morale is critically important to the overall need of an organization to retain valuable employees.

National Guard morale building. Military morale is similar to civilian morale and those lines are even more blurred when working toward morale building in the Army National Guard. The citizen-soldier nature of Guardsmen creates opportunity to build morale among these soldiers differently than one would for active duty soldiers. The differences are not major, but must be taken into consideration.

Morale is paramount to the success of the military or any organization. Britt (2003) contends that employees will become unmotivated if they begin to find that their job lacks meaning. Thus, it is important to instill high morale into the organization. To exemplify this point, Weafer (2001) contends that the Army's retention problem is strongly related to unit morale. He believes that officers are expected to never make mistakes; in short, they are operating in a "zero-defect" environment. These pressures affect those under the command of the affected leaders by decreasing morale overall. Weafer believes that this may be causing many soldiers to leave.

FM 22-100 advises military leaders that "high morale comes from good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect" (p. 3-3). Numerous official Army publications reflect this belief in the military. Several white papers, articles, and other publications discuss the desire by the highest level leaders of the Army and the Army National Guard to instill high morale into their organization (Shinseki, 2002a; Shinseki, 2002b; Schoomaker & Brownlee, 2003; Schultz, 2004). These general officers want to create a culture of high moral character, hard work, and pride–often referred to as the "warrior culture."

Green's (1998) speech articulates that the warrior culture is pervasive in the military. He emphasized those virtues and obligations that military members must embrace. This culture is seen as the primary means with which to give meaning to soldiers' lives and thus, it is argued, to improve morale. While some see this as a strength, others view it as a weakness. Freibel and Raith (2004) argue that the warrior culture is harmful and can cause significant problems and exploitation of power. They point out ways to prevent the abuse of authority, citing supporting evidence from the literature on human resource management and organizational behavior.

As is evidenced by the literature, there are countless theories and methods for improving morale in both business and the military. The importance to this study is that leaders in the National Guard understand the criticality of building morale in their units. Guard leaders must develop this skill by using whichever technique or combination of techniques works best for them–as long as they get it done.

Employee Turnover

Employee retention is an important endeavor for both business and government agencies for many reasons, not the least of which is fiscal responsibility. "Studies have found that the cost of replacing lost talent is seventy to two-hundred percent of that employee's annual salary" (Kaye & Jordan-Evans, 2000). It becomes more and more problematic as well when high levels of turnover occur in an organization. The decrease in motivation and increase in employee burnout cause turnover rates to increase at even higher rates (Dornstein & Zoref, 1986; Egan, Yang, & Bartlett, 2004; Firth & Britton, 1989; Inge, Janssen, Jonge, & Bakker, 2003; Maertz & Griffeth, 2004). These authors argue that low morale and low job satisfaction are "cancers" to an organization and must be contained–or retention of employees will become very difficult.

Many ideas and programs have been developed to improve retention. These may include incentives, benefits, pay raises, perquisites, or other material reward. These retention tools are effective and should be used in modern business practices to prevent employees from leaving the organization. Other means to improve retention rates are intrinsic and leadership based. Heinzman (2004) suggests that employee development, selflessness, and a high level of trust are critical leadership skills to reduce turnover rates. Kaye and Jordan-Evans (2000) contend that career growth opportunities, meaningful work, skilled leadership, and recognition are among the top reasons why people stay at an organization. The team member charged with providing these intrinsic motivators is the leader. Researchers agree that skilled leadership is the key to successful retention policy (Britt, 2003; Cunningham, 1992; Kaye & Jordan-Evans, 2000; La Rocco, Pugh, & Gunderson, 1977; Steel, Griffeth, & Horn, 2002; Stewart & Firestone, 1992; Taylor, 2004). As stated by Taylor (2004), "Organizations no longer can afford to leave the

responsibility for keeping well-performing employees in the hands of the HR department. Responsibility and accountability for retaining talent need to move out to the front lines and into the hands of leaders" (p. 43). Therefore it is critical that leaders have the skills necessary to retain their personnel.

Military Retention

The retention literature discussed is certainly appropriate with regard to the civilian sector, but some may argue that these approaches are not appropriate for the military. Bolton (2002) argues that there are significant differences when one attempts to increase the retention rates of military members. One primary difference is that soldiers are legally bound to obey the orders of those assigned in superior positions. Because of this requirement to follow orders, many military leaders believe there is no real need to motivate troops to perform their functions; they simply must obey. This perspective is accurate up until the decisions to reenlist are made and job satisfaction issues manifest themselves. A military adage says, "soldiers will vote with their feet." In other words, if troops are not properly motivated, they will leave the Army (Knowles, J., Parlier, G., Hoscheit, G., Ayer, R. Lyman, K, & Fancher, R., 2002; Lakhani, 1988; Mehay & Hogan, 1998; Randall, 2002; Stewart & Firestone, 1992; Weafer, 2001).

The question of military retention has become one of incentives versus one of leadership– of intrinsic versus extrinsic satisfiers. Although the two may be used in tandem, it seems that most who write specifically about military retention consider them mutually exclusive. For example, Caldara (2002) and Lakhani (1988) recommend many incentives, such as increasing pay and benefit packages, to encourage soldiers to remain. Though these incentives are useful, they are not within the span of control of unit commanders. Commanders must apply their

leadership craft to motivate by other means (Bolton, 2002; Britt, 2003; Knowles et al., 2002; Weafer, 2001).

By making good decisions that support the troops' satisfaction levels, higher retention rates become a by-product. This is important for unit commanders to understand. FM 22-100 states that Army leaders should communicate purpose, direction, and motivation. These factors, the Army doctrine advises, will work collectively to increase the satisfaction of soldiers.

National Guard Retention

The reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States, to include the Army National Guard, have specific needs that, although shared by their active component counterparts in some cases, are exacerbated by the very nature of a reserve force. These include family support and employer support. These needs are important to discuss in a study that examines a leader's ability to retain Guard soldiers in a wartime environment since the family and the employer play a role in enlistment decisions–and both are affected by leaders (Bolton, 2002).

Family support. The military family is one that, by its very nature, must endure many hardships (Thoresen, & Goldsmith, 1987; Noring, 2000; Rotter & Boveja, 1999; Shulman, Levy-Schiff, & Scharf, 2000). There is little question that families have a significant impact on a soldier's decision to stay. As the soldier's perception of family support increases, so does the rate of reenlistment (Bolton, 2002).

Unit commanders, then, must understand the importance of family support, particularly in the National Guard. The Army provides recommendations in FM 22-100 while discussing the concept of taking care of soldiers. A significant portion of this philosophy is to ensure that families have their needs met. The manual points out the importance of family within the

following passage: "Taking care of soldiers encompasses everything from making sure a soldier has time for an annual dental exam to visiting off-post housing to make sure it's adequate. It also means providing the family support that assures soldiers their families will be taken care of, whether the soldier is home or deployed. Family support means ensuring there's a support group in place, that even the most junior soldier and most inexperienced family members know where to turn for help when their soldier is deployed" (p. 3-4).

The military often struggles with walking the fine line between motivating soldiers to be highly committed to the Nation and the Army as well as to their families. Commanders must assist troops in maintaining this delicate balance. By demonstrating to their charges, with actions as well as words, that the command climate is one that respects the need for family–morale should improve (Bennetts, 2003; Leonard, 2003; Marchese, Bassham, & Ryan, 2002; Thoresen & Goldsmith, 1987).

Employer support. Much has been written about the U.S. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 (Flynn, 2001; Fowler, 2002; Lewison, 2004; Tebo, 2004). The law provides certain statutory rights to employees who take a leave of absence for active military service. This law is typically obeyed, and there are governmental oversight organizations such as the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) charged to serve as ombudsmen to assist in protecting the rights of service members.

At times, however, some businesses do not comply with USERRA by either choice or by lack of knowledge. The mobilization of a Guard member or reservist can cause significant hardship on organizations, particularly among small business (Bell, 2004). These companies need to be informed of the process, and unit leaders must have the necessary skills to talk to the

employers about their soldiers. Through a vigorous community relations campaign, a leader can ensure that the word gets out prior to mobilization of his or her troops. This type of advocacy and personal attention was often promoted by the recent Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz. Schultz (2004) discussed the importance of employers in congressional testimony and published statements. Thus, many employers took action and chose to provide the mobilized service members with additional benefits such as continued health care, salary matching, and support for the families left behind (Dahl, 2005; Fowler, 2002; Leonard, 2003; Tebo, 2004).

Leaders must stay attentive to employer issues. They must remain active in outreach to employers before, during, and after a mobilization takes place. Guard leaders have a responsibility to their troops, and, by promoting positive relationships with local business, they will be able to help alleviate one of the most significant pressures soldiers face when they are deployed.

Summary

The criticisms Northouse (2004) discusses regarding the many fields encompassed in the skills theory of leadership are not unwarranted or unjustified. The review of the literature, in fact, clearly shows this point. Many areas the theory covers that go beyond the scope of this paper. Additionally, there is significant crossover between the skills discussed. Morale building is linked to team building and job satisfaction. Communication is inherent in many of these skills. Isolation of each of these variables for testing and measurement is not difficult, but measuring the synergistic effects one may have upon another is extremely difficult.

Leaders need many skills. Particular to National Guard leaders, the importance of honing these skills is even more important due to the citizen-soldier nature of the organization. Guard leaders must be skilled communicators, motivators, team builders, and morale builders because it is so easy for Guard members to simply quit. Developing the necessary skills in these leaders is important and should help increase retention rates.

Hypotheses

The review of the literature offers some answers to the research questions posed. It is appropriate to hypothesize if a relationship truly exists between leadership skills and retention. Therefore, the following hypotheses are offered:

H_1: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is related to their perception of high job satisfaction.

H2: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high levels of team building skills by leaders.

H3: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception of good leader communication skills.

H4: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high unit morale.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology used to determine if a relationship exists between leader behaviors and soldier retention in the Army National Guard. The structure of this chapter will begin with the design of the study, and then discusses the study population and sample, the instrumentation, the survey administration, the variables, the data collection procedures, and finally the data analysis procedures. It will first address the purpose of the study, the research foundations, and the research design to be employed. This discussion will be followed by a description of the sample, the intended data collection procedures, and the operationalization of relevant constructs. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the data analysis techniques that will be utilized.

Design of the Study

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this descriptive survey study was to test the skills theory of leadership to determine if leadership behaviors of Army National Guard (ARNG) leaders are predictors of a soldier's decision to reenlist. The independent variables were generally defined as those behaviors that leaders exhibit in the form of specific skills or attributes and, for the purposes of this study, include communication, morale, job satisfaction, and team building. The dependent variable were generally defined as a soldier's intent to reenlist as reported at the time he or she takes the survey.

Study Population and Sample

Description of Population

The population for this study consists of approximately 73,714 ARNG soldiers mobilized from July 2003 to December 2005. When ARNG troops are called to active duty they are considered "mobilized." When these soldiers are assembled following active duty, they are "demobilized." The intent of the study is to generalize results to all ARNG mobilized soldiers–as well as those who may mobilize in the future. Thus, the population could reach to all 350,000 if a full-mobilization were enacted.

Description of Sample

This paper examined secondary empirical survey data gathered from 26,250 Army National Guard soldiers who were undergoing demobilization at any point during a 30-month timeframe (July 2003-December 2005). The sample frame was that of soldiers at demobilization stations or those who had recently returned from a mobilization and at their home units. Demobilization stations are military posts or facilities where recently soldiers recently returning from combat pass through for administrative procedures prior to being sent home and deactivated from the Army. Home units are headquartered the local National Guard armories throughout the country. Soldiers return home after a deployment, go to the demobilization station, and then back to their home units.

Subject Identification

Subjects were identified by unit commanders. Commanders elected whether or not to have their units participate in the study. Response rates were nearly 100% (S. Ryer, personal communication, January 26, 2005) because soldiers were directed to participate.

Instrumentation

Survey Instrument

The survey, called the Post-Mobilization survey, is a cross-sectional survey. Commanders issue the survey to their soldiers one time, upon demobilization and at the demobilization station. The survey utilized a questionnaire that was administered at the unit (company) level to ARNG soldiers at the discretion of the unit commander. The questions and responses from this survey are included in Appendix A.

Measures

The self-administered questionnaire consisted of 60 statements, 24 of which are nominal in nature and 26 of which consist of ordinal data using a five-point Likert scale: *1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Not Applicable/Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree.* The remaining 10 questions represent nominal demographic characteristics.

Instrument Testing

The design of the survey instrument entailed a four-step process. First, the developers conducted an extensive review of relevant literature (e.g., academic, government, and military journals) to understand the issue of retention in the military and the National Guard. Next, researchers conducted interviews with soldiers, commanders, and NGB retention experts to gain additional information regarding the research objectives. After these interviews, the researchers conducted focus groups to identify, prioritize, and clarify the issues to be examined. A pilot survey was developed and disseminated to ensure that the instructions and questions were appropriate and understandable for the targeted research population. The questionnaire was then revised and implemented (S. Ryer, personal communication, January 26, 2005).

Administration of Survey

Command Directed

The survey was administered at demobilization stations or upon the soldiers' first return

to their Guard unit during drilling reservist status. The administrative techniques used to obtain

such a large number of respondents were clarified with the Post-Mob survey lead researcher (S.

Ryer, personal communication, January 26, 2005). Following is a brief overview of the

administrative procedures.

Given the military's chain of command structure, the dissemination of the survey

consisted of a two-step process because "gatekeepers" were involved. First, National Guard

Bureau Retention Branch personnel sent the survey to the 54 States, Territories, and the District

of Columbia (herein referred to as "States") where ARNG organizations are located. These

National level personnel asked the State level commanders if they would agree to participate in

the study. It is at this point that the second step in the distribute process took place. If these State

commanders *did* agree to participate, then it was now their responsibility to distribute the surveys

and encourage brigade, battalion, and company commanders to participate. Therefore, this

procedure represents a "command-directed" survey (S. Ryer, personal communication, January

26, 2005).

Comparing Post-Mob Sample vs. ARNG Demographic Profile for Validity

A demographic profile analysis of the Post-Mobilization survey was conducted to ensure

that the demographics of the sample closely compare to the overall demographics of the 333,117

ARNG members on the Guard roles as of September 30, 2005 (Hunter, 2006). The majority of

participants (87%) are male and 13% are female, which is identical to the ARNG as a whole in

which women represent 13% and men represent 87% (Hunter, 2006). Of the sample, 71% are

White and the remaining participants are Black (12%), Hispanic (10%) or 7% "other." This

profile is comparable to the overall racial diversity of the ARNG, which overall consists of 74%

White soldiers, 14% Black, and 8% Hispanic with the remaining 4% from other races. (Hunter,

2006). The rank profile is as follows: Enlisted (Privates/Specialists) 46%; Junior NCOs

(Sergeants/Staff Sergeants) 39%; Senior NCOs (Sergeants First Class, Master/First Sergeants,

Sergeants Major) 8%; and all officers 7%. This breakdown, too, is similar to that of the overall

ARNG, which has 47% Enlisted, 32% Junior NCOs, 10% senior NCOs, and 11% officers

(Hunter, 2006).

Variables

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is represented by the soldier's intent to reenlist. In the survey,

question 20 represents this variable:

> 20. This question asks you how you feel NOW. Having just returned from the
> mobilization, which statement now best describes what you intend to do at the end
> of your current enlistment or military service obligation?
>
> A. Will retire as soon as possible (NO)
> B. Will stay in the Guard until I eventually retire (YES)
> C. Will reenlist or extend (YES)
> D. I do not intend to reenlist or extend, but plan on completing my
>   enlistment/MSO (NO)
> E. I am thinking about getting out sooner than my ETS or MSO (NO)
> F. I know I will get out prior to my ETS or MSO (NO)

As shown in the parenthesis after each response, responses to this question will be

combined and coded as either YES or NO. YES responses show that the soldier does intend to

reenlist while NO responses indicate that the soldier does not intend to reenlist. The parenthetical

YES or NO is not part of the survey but was added by this researcher.

Independent Variables

The independent variables are grouped into three main categories based upon leadership

skills theory: problem solving, social judgment, and social skills (Mumford et al., 2000).

Problem solving. The problem solving skills include the skills of enhancing job-

satisfaction through identifying problems and solving them with limited second and third order

effects. Eleven of the questions reflect job satisfaction/problem solving skills: 36, 44, 46, 47, 49,

50, 51, 52, 54, 55, and 59. Each variable is measured using a five-point Likert scale with choices

of: *1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Not Applicable/Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree.*

36. Before I mobilized, my family obtained military ID cards for medical and commissary benefits without any difficulty.

44. I feel that my family was well cared for by my unit's Family Readiness Program.

45. I believe that my child's mood, behavior, or grades suffered because of the mobilization.

46. My family had adequate medical support during the mobilization.

47. Medical and emotional support (Chaplain or counseling) was available to those SOLDIERS who needed it during the mobilization.

49. I had the appropriate training I needed to perform my mission safely.

50. I had the appropriate equipment I needed to perform my mission safely.

51. Lodging/billeting was adequate based on my duty.

52. It was difficult getting nutritious meals or getting meals in a timely manner.

55. I was paid accurately.

59. I received my mobilization orders in a timely manner, allowing me to make the appropriate arrangements and notifications.

Social judgment. The social judgment skills include the process of team-building by the leader. Four of the questions reflect social judgment skills: 40, 41, 42, and 48. Each is measured by the five-point Likert scale.

40. I feel that my State appreciated my service during the mobilization.

41. I feel that overall, mobilization was a very positive experience for me.

42. During the mobilization, Officer leadership was more interested in moving to the next pay grade than taking care of the troops.

48. I felt a sense of accomplishment in completing my mobilization mission.

Social skills. The social skills include two areas: communication and morale building. Eight of the questions reflect social skills: 33, 39, 43, 53, 54, 57, 58, and 60. Seven are measured by the five-point Likert scale; question 33 is dichotomous in nature (YES/NO).

The communication social skills are operationalized as follows:

33. Did someone in the chain of command personally thank you for doing a good job during the mobilization?

54. I was adequately kept informed about my mission during the mobilization.

57. My spouse or family understood why I needed to serve/participate in this mobilization.

58. The ARNG provided good information to my family (how to contact me in an emergency, what my unit was doing, the importance of the mission, and conditions at mobilization location.)

The morale building skills are operationalized as follows:

39. Officer leadership during the mobilization had a very positive effect on the unit's morale.

43. I felt Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) was adequate during the mobilization.

53. Unit morale was a big problem throughout the mobilization.

60. NCO leadership during the mob had a very positive effect on the unit's morale.

Hypotheses

As stated previously, the four primary hypotheses are:

H_1: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is related to their perception of high job satisfaction.

H2: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high levels of team building skills by leaders.

H3: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception of good leader communication skills.

H4: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high unit morale.

Data Collection Procedures

The survey was made available to Guard commanders at the company level–typically to about 100-150 soldiers–as they passed through the mobilization station. Upon demobilization, soldiers gather at their demobilization site to complete administrative functions necessary to return them to their home state. As part of this process, commanders were able to elect to have their soldiers participate in the Post-Mobilization survey. Instructions for implementation of the survey are included in Appendix B.

Units were brought together in a classroom and the administrative instructions were explained. The script for these announcements is located in Appendix C. Every effort was made to ensure the anonymity of the participants. Units were identified, but individual soldiers were not. Results of the surveys were provided to individual unit commanders in the form of a frequency analysis. Commanders were able to use the information collected to get a general idea about the perceptions assigned soldiers had about the unit leadership and retention.

After reading the script, the administrator passed out original NCR bubble forms and #2 pencils. Each participant then filled out the survey questionnaire until he or she completed the task. There was no time limit to complete the survey. The individual participant brought the forms to the scanner where the administrator scanned the form for inclusion in the database.

According to the chief of National Guard retention, a response rate of nearly 100% is probable (Bliss, G., personal conversation, 5 January 2006), though this is not verifiable due to the procedures. Although participation was not required, commanders typically directed that each member of their unit take the survey. Rarely did soldiers fail to comply with the commander's desire to have full unit participation.

Data Analysis Procedures

As noted previously, there was no means of calculating the response rate of this study. Thus, determining a non-response rate was not possible. Additionally, there was no means of determining response bias. Because this survey was command directed, there was probably very little non-response; the researcher's personal experience with the Army supports this belief since soldiers are trained to follow commands without question.

A descriptive analysis of all independent variables and the dependent variable was conducted as well, to include an examination of frequencies, means, medians, and the standard deviations for each.

As previously mentioned, the dependent variable was *intent to reenlist*. This variable was measured as nominal data and has been collapsed to a yes or no response. The independent variables were ordinal data with the exception of question 33, which was nominal. Because both nominal and ordinal data do not have interval data characteristics, non-parametric tests were conducted. To measure relationships between the dependant variable and independent variables of leadership skills, Chi Square tests were used. Although Chi Square tests are used primarily to measure nominal data, it is also useful when measuring the strength of relationships between nominal and ordinal data (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). To reduce prediction errors, the Lambda coefficient and Goodman and Kruskal's tau were calculated. The results of the Chi Square test determined if a relationship exists between each independent variable and the dependent variable. Cross tabulations were used as well to examine patterns in the data.

The statistics were computed using SPSS version 12.0 for Windows.

CHAPTER 4. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this descriptive survey study was to test the skills theory of leadership to determine if leadership behaviors of Army National Guard (ARNG) leaders are predictors of a soldier's decision to reenlist. This study sought to answer two research questions:

3. Which leader behaviors correlate with an ARNG soldier's decision to reenlist?

4. Do Army National Guard soldiers require leadership behaviors that are different from what is trained in standard Army leadership doctrine?

This chapter provides the findings of the study. The chapter is divided into the following sections: population and respondents

Population and Respondents

Population

As discussed earlier, the population for this study consists of approximately 73,714 ARNG soldiers mobilized from July 2003 to December 2005. When ARNG troops are called to active duty they are considered "mobilized." When these soldiers are assembled following active duty, they are "demobilized." The population could reach to all 350,000 if a full-mobilization were enacted. The intent of the study was to generalize results to all ARNG mobilized soldiers– as well as those who may mobilize in the future, therefore it is appropriate to understand the demographics for the ARNG as a whole.

All of these demographics were compiled by Hunter (2006) from official Army National Guard reporting systems. As seen in table 1 through table 6, the demographic profile of both the

population and the respondents are very similar. Most are men, White, young, and in the lower

enlisted ranks.

Consisting of 333,117 members as of September 30, 2005 the majority of Guard

members were men (87%) with the remaining being female (13%). The Guard is racially diverse,

consisting of 74% Caucasian, 14% Black, 8% Hispanic, and 4% "Other." This final category

combines Asian, Pacific Island, American Indian, Middle Eastern, and other races. One very

useful demographic is the rank of the individual soldiers. The military has a strict hierarchical

rank scheme that is segregated between enlisted soldiers (including junior enlisted and non-

commissioned officers) and officers (including warrant and commissioned officers). The Guard

as a whole consists of 47% Enlisted (Private, Private First Class, Specialist), 32% Junior NCOs

(Sergeant, Staff Sergeant), 10% senior NCOs (Sergeant First Class, Master/First Sergeant,

Sergeant Major), and 11% officers. The officers contain all warrant officers (Ranked Warrant

Officer 1 through Chief Warrant Officer 5) and all commissioned officers (Lieutenant, Captain,

Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and General Officers).

Respondents

Respondents consist of 26,250 Army National Guard soldiers who were demobilizing

between July 2003 and December 2005. Since the respondent selection was reliant upon

Commanders who were willing to allow their units (soldiers) to participate, participants were not

randomly selected. However, the survey dissemination process was command-directed;

therefore, the response rate among those personnel who were actually offered the opportunity to

participate is nearly 100%. Still, the exact response rate is unknown because the Army National

Guard did not implement a tracking mechanism determine whether every mobilized soldier had

such an opportunity to take the survey. Individual autonomy was guaranteed; respondents were not required to self-identify anywhere on the response form. Unit retention staff then scanned the "Scantron" type forms into computers. This computer tabulation technique was used to ensure that the data have a high degree of reliability (S. Ryer, personal communication, January 26, 2005).

The majority of participants (87%) are male and 13% are female, which is indicative of the ARNG as a whole (Hunter, 2006). Of the sample, 71% are White and the remaining participants are Black (12%), Hispanic (10%) or 7% "other." This profile is comparable to the overall racial diversity of the ARNG (Hunter, 2006). Among this sample, the age ranges are: 17-24 (32%), 25-32 (28%), 33-40 (23%) and 41+ (17%). The rank profile is as follows: Enlisted (Privates/Specialists) 46%; Junior NCOs (Sergeants/Staff Sergeants) 39%; Senior NCOs (Sergeants First Class, Master/First Sergeants, Sergeants Major) 8%; and all officers 7%. This breakdown, too, is similar to that of the overall ARNG (Hunter, 2006).The marital status among this sample is evenly distributed: 49% married and 51% are not. Nearly half of the respondents (45%) have children under the age of 18 still living at home.

Comparing Population and Respondents

It was noted in chapter 3 that the demographic profile of the respondents is similar to that of the Guard as a whole. The demographics above confirm this and are depicted in tables 1 through 3. The frequencies for the respondents are reported as valid responses and do not include missing data.

Table 1. *Sex of Population and Respondents*

	Population		Respondents	
Sex	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Male	290,417	87	22,415	87
Female	42,760	13	3,331	13
Total	333,177	100	25,746	100

Table 2. *Race of Population and Respondents*

	Population		Respondents	
Age	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
White	246,612	74	18,330	71 (71.0)
Black	45,520	14	3,042	12 (11.8)
Hispanic	24,683	7	2,473	10 (9.6)
Other	16,362	5	1,972	8 (7.6)
Total	333,177	100	25,817	100

Table 3. *Rank of Population and Respondents*

	Population		Respondents	
Race	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Enlisted	157,477	47	12,108	46
Jr NCO	106,356	32	10,094	39
Sr NCO	32,790	10	2,096	8
Officers	36,554	11	1,792	7
Total	333,177	100	26,090	100

Tables 4 to 6 show additional demographics about the respondents that are not available for the overall population, but lend further insight to the family situation of respondents.

Table 4. *Age of Respondents*

Race	Respondents	
	N	%
17-24	8,376	32
25-32	7,225	28
33-40	5,970	23
>41	4,330	17
Total	25,901	100

Table 5. *Marital Status of Respondents*

Race	Respondents	
	N	%
Married	12,594	49
Single	13280	51
Total	25,874	100

Table 6. *Respondents with Children Under Age 18 at Home*

Race	Respondents	
	N	%
Yes	11,322	45
No	14,014	55
Total	25,336	100

Results

As was shown in the previous section, the demographics of the participants of the study and the population are nearly identical. This finding allows for a deeper analysis. The remainder of this chapter addresses the study's two general research questions:

1. Which leader behaviors correlate with an ARNG soldier's decision to reenlist?

2. Do Army National Guard soldiers require leadership behaviors that are different from what is trained in standard Army leadership doctrine?

The first research question examined the relationship between leader behaviors and the decision of a Guard soldier to reenlist. To support this question, four hypotheses were developed. These hypotheses were based in Mumford's leadership skills theory and each predict that the tested leadership skill is not independent of the decision to reenlist.

The chi-square statistic was conducted to determine statistical significance of these hypotheses. Chi-square (χ^2) is based upon the expected and the observed frequencies when data are compared (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). A large chi-square statistic will indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between two variables. This statistical significance exists if $p = < .05$.

This study brought forth four primary hypotheses. Additional sub-hypotheses were then developed for each of these hypotheses were operationalized and analyzed using questions from the Post-Mobilization Survey. Each are listed as follows and are the research hypotheses for this paper.

Problem Solving Skills: Hypothesis One

H$_1$ stated (null): A National Guard soldier's intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception of high job satisfaction. This hypothesis has eleven sub-hypotheses. Each is based upon a question from the survey and is listed below.

H$_{1A}$ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the ease of family members being able to obtain military ID cards. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 36 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 36 is "Before I mobilized, my family obtained military ID cards for medical and commissary benefits without any difficulty."

Table 7. *Crosstabulation for H$_{1A}$*

			Family Obtained ID Cards Easily					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	975	1031	3866	3085	2045	11002
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	8.9%	9.4%	35.1%	28.0%	18.6%	100.0%
	No	Count	1743	1447	6196	3386	1697	14469
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	12.0%	10.0%	42.8%	23.4%	11.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	2718	2478	10062	6471	3742	25471
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	10.7%	9.7%	39.5%	25.4%	14.7%	100.0%

Table 8. *Chi Square Tests for H_{1A}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	408.407(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	407.668	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	306.794	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25471		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1070.35.

Since the p-value is .000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the ease of family members being able to obtain military ID cards. It appears that the easier it is to get family ID cards, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{1B} stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to how well their family was cared for by the unit's family readiness program. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 44 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 44 is "I feel that my family was well cared for by my unit's Family Readiness Program."

Table 9a. *Crosstabulation for H_{1B}*

			FRG Supported Family					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1776	1903	3574	2842	930	11025
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	16.1%	17.3%	32.4%	25.8%	8.4%	100.0%

Table 9b. *Crosstabulation for H$_{1B}$*

No	Count	3190	2618	4798	3034	841	14481
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	22.0%	18.1%	33.1%	21.0%	5.8%	100.0%
Total	Count	4966	4521	8372	5876	1771	25506
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	19.5%	17.7%	32.8%	23.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Table 10. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{1B}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	241.547(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	242.416	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	227.101	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25506		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 765.52.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to care of families by the unit's Family Readiness Group. It appears that the better families are cared for by the unit FRG, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H$_{1C}$ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their belief that their child's mood, behavior, or grades suffered because of the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 45 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 45 is "I believe that my child's mood, behavior, or grades suffered because of the mobilization."

Table 11. *Crosstabulation for H₁C*

| | | | Children Suffered | | | | | |
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	692	1301	5769	2116	1149	11027
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	6.3%	11.8%	52.3%	19.2%	10.4%	100.0%
	No	Count	678	1022	8794	2138	1828	14460
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	4.7%	7.1%	60.8%	14.8%	12.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	1370	2323	14563	4254	2977	25487
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	5.4%	9.1%	57.1%	16.7%	11.7%	100.0%

Table 12. *Chi Square Tests for H₁C*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	361.121(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	359.211	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	43.890	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25487		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 592.73.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to belief that children's mood, behavior, or grades suffering because of the mobilization. It appears that the less a soldier

believes his children are suffering because of the mobilization, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{ID} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related the adequacy of medical support family members had during the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 46 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 46 is "My family had adequate medical support during the mobilization."

Table 13. *Crosstabulation for H_{ID}*

			Family Adequate Medical Support					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	650	904	4527	3587	1358	11026
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	5.9%	8.2%	41.1%	32.5%	12.3%	100.0%
	No	Count	1125	1256	7336	3604	1167	14488
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.8%	8.7%	50.6%	24.9%	8.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	1775	2160	11863	7191	2525	25514
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.0%	8.5%	46.5%	28.2%	9.9%	100.0%

Table 14a. *Chi Square Tests for H_{ID}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Table 14b. *Chi Square Tests for H_{1D}*

Pearson Chi-Square	401.735(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	401.078	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	266.922	1	.000
N of Valid Cases		25514	

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 767.07.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the level of medical support families had during the mobilization. It appears that the higher the level of medical support, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{1E} stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the emotional support available to soldiers. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 47 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 47 is "Medical and emotional support (Chaplain or counseling) was available to those SOLDIERS who needed it during the mobilization."

Table 15a. *Crosstabulation for H_{1E}*

			Training for Safe Mission					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1159	1834	1390	4918	1722	11023
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	10.5%	16.6%	12.6%	44.6%	15.6%	100.0%

Table 15b. *Crosstabulation for H$_{1E}$*

			2427	3060	2137	5427	1400	14451
No	Count		2427	3060	2137	5427	1400	14451
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist		16.8%	21.2%	14.8%	37.6%	9.7%	100.0%
Total	Count		3586	4894	3527	10345	3122	25474
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist		14.1%	19.2%	13.8%	40.6%	12.3%	100.0%

Table 16. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{1E}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	520.070(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	523.664	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	500.982	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25474		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1350.94.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to medical and emotional support available to soldiers who needed it during a mobilization. It appears that the more available Chaplain or counseling support was, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H$_{1F}$ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the appropriate level of training needed to perform their mission safely. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 49 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 49 is "I had the appropriate training I needed to perform my mission safely."

Table 17. *Crosstabulation for H_{1F}*

			Equipment for Safe Mission					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1860	2504	1404	4061	1224	11053
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	16.8%	22.7%	12.7%	36.7%	11.1%	100.0%
	No	Count	3665	3361	1863	4636	1087	14612
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	25.1%	23.0%	12.7%	31.7%	7.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	5525	5865	3267	8697	2311	25665
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	21.5%	22.9%	12.7%	33.9%	9.0%	100.0%

Table 18. *Chi Square Tests for H_{1F}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	338.517(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	342.074	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	302.024	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25665		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 995.27.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to quality of training

provided to soldiers. It appears that the more trained the soldier feels, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{1G} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the appropriate level of equipment needed to perform their mission safely. This hypothesis was evaluated by measuring responses between question 20 and question 50. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 50 is "I had the appropriate equipment I needed to perform my mission safely."

Table 19. *Crosstabulation for H_{1G}*

			Equipment for Safe Mission					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1860	2504	1404	4061	1224	11053
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	16.8%	22.7%	12.7%	36.7%	11.1%	100.0%
	No	Count	3665	3361	1863	4636	1087	14612
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	25.1%	23.0%	12.7%	31.7%	7.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	5525	5865	3267	8697	2311	25665
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	21.5%	22.9%	12.7%	33.9%	9.0%	100.0%

Table 20a. *Chi Square Tests for H_{1G}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Table 20b. *Chi Square Tests for H₁G*

Pearson Chi-Square	338.517(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	342.074	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	302.024	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25665		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 995.27.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the appropriate equipment needed to safely perform the mission. It appears that the better equipped the soldier feels, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₁H stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the availability of adequate lodging. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 51 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 51 is "Lodging/billeting was adequate based on my duty."

Table 21a. *Crosstabulation for H₁H*

			Lodging Adequate					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1772	1667	1650	4277	1656	11022
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	16.1%	15.1%	15.0%	38.8%	15.0%	100.0%

Table 21b. *Crosstabulation for H₁H*

No	Count	3220	2508	2222	4947	1557	14454
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	22.3%	17.4%	15.4%	34.2%	10.8%	100.0%
Total	Count	4992	4175	3872	9224	3213	25476
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	19.6%	16.4%	15.2%	36.2%	12.6%	100.0%

Table 22. *Chi Square Tests for H₁H*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	268.163(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	269.503	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	265.191	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25476		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1390.08.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to adequacy of lodging/billeting available. It appears that when a soldier perceives lodging to be adequate, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₁I stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to the difficulty in getting nutritious meals. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 52 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 52 is "It was difficult getting nutritious meals or getting meals in a timely manner."

Table 23. *Crosstabulation for H_{11}*

			Meals a Problem					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	2012	3922	1911	2072	1104	11021
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	18.3%	35.6%	17.3%	18.8%	10.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	2034	4458	2575	3226	2181	14474
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	14.1%	30.8%	17.8%	22.3%	15.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	4046	8380	4486	5298	3285	25495
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	15.9%	32.9%	17.6%	20.8%	12.9%	100.0%

Table 24. *Chi Square Tests for H_{11}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	274.513(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	277.064	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	271.336	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25495		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1420.04.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the difficulty in getting nutritious meals or getting meals in a timely manner. It appears that the easier it is to get nutritious meals, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₁ⱼ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to accurate pay during the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 55 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 55 is "I was paid accurately."

Table 25. *Crosstabulation for H₁ⱼ*

			Paid Accurately					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV- Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	661	1058	1134	5793	2345	10991
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	6.0%	9.6%	10.3%	52.7%	21.3%	100.0%
	No	Count	1360	1688	1741	7238	2402	14429
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	9.4%	11.7%	12.1%	50.2%	16.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	2021	2746	2875	13031	4747	25420
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	8.0%	10.8%	11.3%	51.3%	18.7%	100.0%

Table 26. *Chi Square Tests for H₁ⱼ*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	214.313(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	216.627	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	207.569	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25420		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 873.83.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the accuracy of pay. It appears that when paid accurately, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{1K} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related obtaining orders in a timely manner. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 59 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 59 is "I received my mobilization orders in a timely manner, allowing me to make the appropriate arrangements and notifications."

Table 27. *Crosstabulation for H_{1K}*

			Mobilization Orders Timely					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	2051	2051	1314	4319	1100	10835
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	18.9%	18.9%	12.1%	39.9%	10.2%	100.0%
	No	Count	4042	2874	1964	4498	941	14319
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	28.2%	20.1%	13.7%	31.4%	6.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	6093	4925	3278	8817	2041	25154
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	24.2%	19.6%	13.0%	35.1%	8.1%	100.0%

Table 28a. *Chi Square Tests for H_{1K}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Table 28b. *Chi Square Tests for H₁ₖ*

Pearson Chi-Square	459.288(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	462.544	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	425.388	1	.000
N of Valid Cases		25154	

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 879.15.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the timeliness in which mobilization orders were received, allowing time to make the appropriate arrangements and notifications. It appears that more timely the mobilization orders were published, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

Social Judgment Skills: Hypothesis Two

H2 stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to levels of team building skills by leaders. This hypothesis has four sub-hypotheses. Each is based upon a question from the survey; following are the results.

H₂ₐ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to feelings that their leaders appreciated their service. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 40 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 40 is "I feel that my State appreciated my service during the mobilization."

Table 29. *Crosstabulation for H$_{2A}$*

			State Appreciated Service					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	990	1225	1785	4351	2632	10983
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	9.0%	11.2%	16.3%	39.6%	24.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	2143	2038	2730	5141	2452	14504
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	14.8%	14.1%	18.8%	35.4%	16.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	3133	3263	4515	9492	5084	25487
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	12.3%	12.8%	17.7%	37.2%	19.9%	100.0%

Table 30. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{2A}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	418.366(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	422.657	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	409.682	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25487		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1350.09.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the feeling of appreciation by leaders. It appears that more appreciated the soldier feels, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₂ᵦ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is

not related to feelings that the mobilization was a very positive experience. This hypothesis was

evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 41 on the survey. Question 20

asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 41 is "I feel

that overall, mobilization was a very positive experience for me."

Table 31. *Crosstabulation for H₂ᵦ*

| | | | Mobilization a Positive Experience | | | | | |
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	821	1295	2108	4614	2175	11013
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.5%	11.8%	19.1%	41.9%	19.7%	100.0%
	No	Count	3179	2979	3149	3918	1244	14469
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	22.0%	20.6%	21.8%	27.1%	8.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	4000	4274	5257	8532	3419	25482
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	15.7%	16.8%	20.6%	33.5%	13.4%	100.0%

Table 32. *Chi Square Tests for H₂ᵦ*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2140.639(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	2217.187	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2127.719	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25482		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1477.65.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the feeling of the mobilization being a positive experience. It appears that the more the soldier feels that the mobilization was positive, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{2C} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception that officer leadership was more interested in promotion than taking care of the troops. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 42 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 42 is "During the mobilization, Officer leadership was more interested in moving to the next pay grade than taking care of the troops."

Table 33. *Crosstabulation for H_{2C}*

			Leaders Self-Interested					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1359	2242	2418	2345	2662	11026
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	12.3%	20.3%	21.9%	21.3%	24.1%	100.0%
	No	Count	1204	2032	2674	3025	5542	14477
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	8.3%	14.0%	18.5%	20.9%	38.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	2563	4274	5092	5370	8204	25503
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	10.0%	16.8%	20.0%	21.1%	32.2%	100.0%

Table 34. *Chi Square Tests for H₂C*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	675.070(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	683.383	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	609.185	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25503		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1108.09.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the perception of officer leadership being more interested in being promoted than taking care of troops. It appears that the better the image of officers is, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₂D stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to a feeling of accomplishment from the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 48 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 49 is "I felt a sense of accomplishment in completing my mobilization mission."

Table 35a. *Crosstabulation for H₂D*

			Sense of Accomplishment					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	705	961	1363	4785	3214	11028
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	6.4%	8.7%	12.4%	43.4%	29.1%	100.0%

Table 35b. *Crosstabulation for H2D*

No	Count		1839	1997	2191	5866	2566	14459
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist		12.7%	13.8%	15.2%	40.6%	17.7%	100.0%
Total	Count		2544	2958	3554	10651	5780	25487
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist		10.0%	11.6%	13.9%	41.8%	22.7%	100.0%

Table 36. *Chi Square Tests for H2D*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	796.152(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	808.485	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	768.133	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25487		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1100.77.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the sense of accomplished felt by soldiers by completing their mobilization mission. It appears that higher the sense of accomplishment, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

Social Skills: Hypothesis Three (Communication)

H3 stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception of good leader communication skills. This hypothesis has four sub-hypotheses. Each is based upon a question from the survey and is listed below.

H3A stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to being personally thanked by unit leaders. This hypothesis was evaluated by

comparing responses to question 20 and question 33 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the

soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 3 is "Did someone in the

chain of command personally thank you for doing a good job during the mobilization?"

Table 37. *Crosstabulation for H$_{3A}$*

| | | | Chain of Command Thanked | | |
			Yes	No	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	8195	2509	10704
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	76.6%	23.4%	100.0%
	No	Count	8979	4924	13903
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	64.6%	35.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	17174	7433	24607
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	69.8%	30.2%	100.0%

Table 38a. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{3A}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	411.502(b)	1	.000		
Continuity Correction(a)	410.935	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	417.803	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	411.486	1	.000		

Table 38b. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{3A}$*

N of Valid Cases	24607

a Computed only for a 2x2 table

b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3233.34.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to being personally thanked by someone in the chain of command. It appears that when unit leaders thank the soldier, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H$_{3B}$ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to being kept adequately informed about their mission. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 54 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 54 is "I was adequately kept informed about my mission during the mobilization."

Table 39a. *Crosstabulation for H$_{3B}$*

			Informed of Mission					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1933	2649	1710	3836	883	11011
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	17.6%	24.1%	15.5%	34.8%	8.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	4221	3779	2100	3577	768	14445
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	29.2%	26.2%	14.5%	24.8%	5.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	6154	6428	3810	7413	1651	25456

Table 39b. *Crosstabulation for H₃ᵦ*

	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	24.2%	25.3%	15.0%	29.1%	6.5%	100.0%

Table 40. *Chi Square Tests for H₃ᵦ*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	654.959(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	663.508	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	625.998	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25456		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 714.14.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the level if information disseminated about the mission during the mobilization. It appears that the more information about the mission communicated to the soldier, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H₃c stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to family members understanding why they needed to serve in the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 57 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 57 is "My spouse or family understood why I needed to serve/participate in this mobilization."

Table 41. *Crosstabulation for H$_{3C}$*

| | | | Family Understood Mob | | | | | |
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	492	794	1796	5246	2485	10813
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	4.6%	7.3%	16.6%	48.5%	23.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	1492	1794	2978	6105	1944	14313
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	10.4%	12.5%	20.8%	42.7%	13.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	1984	2588	4774	11351	4429	25126
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.9%	10.3%	19.0%	45.2%	17.6%	100.0%

Table 42. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{3C}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	842.987(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	862.436	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	832.475	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25126		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 853.82.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to understanding by family members of why the soldier needed to participate in the mobilization. It appears that

better the communication with the family as to why the mobilization was important, the more

likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{3D} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is

not related to leaders providing good information to family while the unit was deployed. This

hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 58 on the survey.

Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 58

is "The ARNG provided good information to my family (how to contact me in an emergency,

what my unit was doing, the importance of the mission, and conditions at mobilization

location)."

Table 43. *Crosstabulation for H_{3D}*

			ARNG Good Info to Family					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1417	2244	2565	3631	964	10821
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	13.1%	20.7%	23.7%	33.6%	8.9%	100.0%
	No	Count	2991	3355	3547	3719	717	14329
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	20.9%	23.4%	24.8%	26.0%	5.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	4408	5599	6112	7350	1681	25150
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	17.5%	22.3%	24.3%	29.2%	6.7%	100.0%

Table 44. *Chi Square Tests for H₃D*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	497.999(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	501.597	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	477.445	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25150		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 723.26.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the quality of communication provided to families during a mobilization. It appears that the better families are communicated with, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

Social Skills: Hypothesis Four (Morale Building)

H4 stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high unit morale. This hypothesis has four sub-hypotheses. Each is based upon a question from the survey and is listed below.

H₄A stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception that officer leadership had a very positive effect on the unit's morale. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 39 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 39 is "Officer leadership during the mobilization had a very positive effect on the unit's morale."

Table 45. *Crosstabulation for H₄A*

			Officers Positive on Morale					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	3286	2631	1913	2192	972	10994
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	29.9%	23.9%	17.4%	19.9%	8.8%	100.0%
	No	Count	6634	3190	1900	1804	903	14431
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	46.0%	22.1%	13.2%	12.5%	6.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	9920	5821	3813	3996	1875	25425
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	39.0%	22.9%	15.0%	15.7%	7.4%	100.0%

Table 46. *Chi Square Tests for H₄A*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	773.402(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	780.479	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	659.279	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25425		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 810.77.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the effect of officer leadership on unit morale. It appears that more positive the effect of officer leadership on unit morale, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{4B} stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is

not related to the adequacy of Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) during the mobilization.

This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 43 on the

survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers);

question 43 is "I felt Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) was adequate during the

mobilization."

Table 47. *Crosstabulation for H_{4B}*

			MWR Adequate					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	692	1301	5769	2116	1149	11027
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	6.3%	11.8%	52.3%	19.2%	10.4%	100.0%
	No	Count	678	1022	8794	2138	1828	14460
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	4.7%	7.1%	60.8%	14.8%	12.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	1370	2323	14563	4254	2977	25487
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	5.4%	9.1%	57.1%	16.7%	11.7%	100.0%

Table 48. *Chi Square Tests for H_{4B}*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	361.121(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	359.211	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	43.890	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25487		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 592.73.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the adequacy of MWR during a mobilization. It appears that more adequate MWR was, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H_{4C} *stated (null):* National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception that unit morale was a big problem throughout the mobilization. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 53 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 53 is "Unit morale was a big problem throughout the mobilization."

Table 49. *Crosstabulation for H_{4C}*

			Unit Morale Problem					
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	859	2417	1802	3232	2698	11008
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.8%	22.0%	16.4%	29.4%	24.5%	100.0%
	No	Count	935	1859	1891	3915	5855	14455
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	6.5%	12.9%	13.1%	27.1%	40.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	1794	4276	3693	7147	8553	25463
		% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	7.0%	16.8%	14.5%	28.1%	33.6%	100.0%

Table 50. *Chi Square Tests for H$_{4C}$*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	857.823(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	868.993	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	647.820	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	25463		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 775.57.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to the perception of unit morale. It appears that less unit morale is perceived as a problem, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

H$_{4D}$ stated (null): National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception that non-commissioned officer leadership had a very positive effect on the unit's morale. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing responses to question 20 and question 60 on the survey. Question 20 asks if the soldier intends to reenlist (recoded to "yes" or "no" answers); question 60 is "NCO leadership during the mob had a very positive effect on the unit's morale."

Table 51a. *Crosstabulation for H$_{4D}$*

			NCOs Positive on Morale					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	NA/Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
DV-Intent to Reenlist	Yes	Count	1930	1892	1854	3387	1598	10661

Table 51b. *Crosstabulation for H4DError! Bookmark not defined.*

	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	18.1%	17.7%	17.4%	31.8%	15.0%	100.0%
No	Count	4524	2890	2220	3030	1441	14105
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	32.1%	20.5%	15.7%	21.5%	10.2%	100.0%
Total	Count	6454	4782	4074	6417	3039	24766
	% within DV-Intent to Reenlist	26.1%	19.3%	16.4%	25.9%	12.3%	100.0%

Table 52. *Chi Square Tests for H4D*

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	849.212(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	862.890	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	798.098	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	24766		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1308.20.

Since the p-value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. As a result, it can be concluded that a soldier's decision to reenlist is related to effect of non-commissioned officer leadership on unit morale. It appears that more positive the effect of non-commissioned officer leadership on unit morale, the more likely the soldier is to intend to reenlist.

CHAPTER 5. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter addresses the implications of a research study to determine the whether leadership skills displayed by Army National Guard supervisors are related to their soldiers' intent to reenlist after a mobilization. The results of this research suggest that the skill sets of problem solving, social judgment, and social skills are related to this important and intensely personal decision. The chapter will begin by providing the answers to the research questions and discuss the four primary hypotheses. These sections will be followed by the overall conclusions that are based upon the findings of the study. Recommendations for improving ARNG leadership and retention will follow. The paper will close with recommendations for future research and short closing comments.

The Research Questions

This study sought to answer two questions about leadership skills and retaining troops in the Army National Guard. The first research question was: which leader skills are related to ARNG soldier's decision to reenlist? Problem solving skills, social judgment skills, and social skills were examined and every one of the leadership skills tested was positively related to a soldier's desire to reenlist.

The second research question asked: do Army National Guard soldiers require leadership behaviors that are different from what is trained in standard Army leadership doctrine? The nature of this question is whether Army leadership doctrine is appropriate to the ARNG leaders with regard to retaining soldiers. Based upon the literature review and upon the results of this study, it is evident that the Army doctrine is very applicable. The results indicate that if Guard

leaders master those skills taught in Army leadership doctrine–and leadership skills theory–they should have significantly higher retention rates.

The Hypotheses

This study developed four hypotheses, each suggesting that one category of leadership skills was related to Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist.

Hypothesis One–Problem Solving Skills

H_1 stated: National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is related to their perception of high job satisfaction.

This hypothesis consisted of eleven sub-hypotheses, each testing one problem solving skill that enhances job satisfaction. The Chi-Square test of Independence resulted in the researcher rejecting the null hypotheses for each of these four sub-hypotheses and concluding that high job satisfaction is related to the decision to reenlist in the Army National Guard after a recent mobilization.

Hypothesis Two–Social Judgment

H2 stated: A National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high levels of team building skills by leaders.

This hypothesis consisted of four sub-hypotheses, each testing one social judgment skill that displays good team building. The Chi-Square test of Independence resulted in the researcher rejecting the null hypotheses for each of these four sub-hypotheses and concluding that high levels of team building skills is related to the decision to reenlist in the Army National Guard after a recent mobilization.

Hypothesis Three–Social Skills: Communication

H3 stated: A National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to their perception of good leader communication skills.

This hypothesis consisted of four sub-hypotheses, each testing one social skill that displays good communication. The Chi-Square test of Independence resulted in the researcher rejecting the null hypotheses for each of these four sub-hypotheses and concluding that high levels of communication skills is related to the decision to reenlist in the Army National Guard after a recent mobilization.

Hypothesis Four–Social Skills: Morale Building

H4 stated: A National Guard soldiers' intent to reenlist after a recent mobilization is not related to high unit morale.

This hypothesis consisted of four sub-hypotheses, each testing one social skill that enhances morale. The Chi-Square test of Independence resulted in the researcher rejecting the null hypotheses for each of these four sub-hypotheses and concluding that high levels unit morale building skills is related to the decision to reenlist in the Army National Guard after a recent mobilization.

Conclusions

This study has tested the relationship of leadership skills to that desire to reenlist and it is clear that soldiers in the Army National Guard are influenced to stay (or leave) by the behaviors of their leaders. Five overarching deductions can be drawn from these results. First, by improving job satisfaction in the ranks, soldiers will be more apt to reenlist. Second, by

increasing the level of unit teamwork, or espirit de corps, reenlistment rates should improve. Third, improving leader communication skills will improve reenlistment rates. Fourth, increasing unit morale will increase retention rates. And fifth, training ARNG leaders on these leadership skills–and ensuring that they know the importance of these skills to retaining their soldiers–will improve retention in the Guard.

<div align="center">Recommendations for the Army National Guard</div>

Based upon the five conclusions, several recommendations can be made that will help the Army National Guard to improve retention through the enhancement of those leadership skills found in Army doctrine and in leadership skills theory. These recommendations are grouped into five areas: (a) improving job satisfaction, (b) building cohesive teams, (c) communicating effectively, (d) improving morale, and (e) leadership skills training through continuing education.

Improving Job Satisfaction

Keeping soldiers satisfied with their jobs during wartime is truly a daunting task. The likelihood that everyone will remain motivated and truly satisfied during the intense, deadly environment that soldiers in combat live with every day is low. Thus, commanders are faced with a very challenging task.

Currently, the government is offering several of Hertzberg's hygiene factors to increase job satisfaction. Pay incentives are given to deployed soldiers, including tax-free pay, combat zone stipends, and significant tax-free bonuses for reenlisting while in a combat zone. Each of these incentives is very effective and should be continued.

These incentives are only half of the overall solution, however. Followers of Hertzberg contend that improving both motivator and hygiene factors will enhance job satisfaction. Guard leaders do not have much influence over the hygiene factors, however. They must influence the soldiers by ensuring that their needs are met at a more personal level–Hertzberg's motivators. This section will address recommendations for three of these areas, though it is stipulated that there are dozens of areas in which commanders could improve job satisfaction. The three are the security, administration, and the homefront. It should be noted that these are all leadership skills, and more specifically, they are problem-solving skills. Thus, to discuss the idea of "improving leadership" would be inclusive in every recommendation in this paper.

Security. To improve job satisfaction in a combat zone, several areas must be addressed. First, even before leaving the United States for a deployment, soldiers must be well trained in combat skills. This critical leader skill will ensure that lives are saved. During drill weekends– long before a unit has any idea that they are going to be mobilized–commanders must place a significant emphasis on demanding training in the job skill in which the soldier enlisted. This training must be battle-focused. If the unit is infantry, intense infantry training must be conducted. Soldiers should not conduct their drills in the armory, but should be in the field every drill weekend regardless of weather. If it is a truck driving unit, soldiers should be focusing on combat convoy operations and ensuring that the soldiers know how to react to an ambush or and Improvised Explosive Device (IED). If it is a medical unit, troops should train in field hospitals, not in an office. This type of realistic, combat oriented training is crucial to improving job satisfaction during a deployment. Training as one fights will not only improve the level of

combat skills in the soldiers, but will also force the unit to gain awareness and insight about the importance of the combat skills they are developing.

Ensuring that appropriate and well-maintained equipment is available to soldiers is also important. Getting the most modern and the safest gear, vehicles, communication systems, and weapons systems is a challenge but can be done. Once obtained, commanders must place a heavy influence upon maintaining that equipment. For example, when soldiers see that leaders are focusing on ensuring that weapons are cleaned and maintained, that trucks are running perfectly, or that night-vision goggles are functioning flawlessly–they will be highly satisfied with this realm of the security issue.

Once deployed, leaders need to ensure that the Forward Operating Base (FOB) is relatively safe from attack. Following the physical security protocols and demanding excellence from the troops assigned to perform the security mission will allow all of the troops on the base to "relax" a bit when they are inside. Offering a respite or sanctuary is not possible in combat, but by having outstanding security in a FOB, there is a much greater sense of comfort and safety than if the troops know that their base is highly vulnerable to attack–and this exposure could be improved if the command would increase their efforts.

Administration. Included in the administration section are many suggestions. Principle among them is ensuring that soldiers are paid on time, every time. This goes for monthly pay, bonuses, stipends, and any other pay needed. Commanders must ensure that their unit clerks are working hard to focus on fixing any pay problems that arise. Soldiers cannot be worrying about how the mortgage or rent will be paid when they need to be focused on their mission.

Another area of administration is getting replacements. Units in combat must be fully manned, and it is the responsibility of unit commanders to ensure that this is the case. When there are unit vacancies, other soldiers have to fill in and do those tasks that would normally be completed by others if the unit were fully manned. The process of getting new soldiers is cumbersome, but as with fixing pay problems, commanders need to place emphasis on this critical requirement.

Food is highly important to soldiers. They need nutritious, calorie-dense meals–and it needs to be tasty. A variety should also be available. The old saying that "an army travels on its stomach" is quite accurate. Having good food is an easy way for commanders to improve levels of job satisfaction.

Finally, commanders should be continually improving the overall quality of life. Once the basics are done–security, pay, replacements, food, etc.–leaders should ensure that special things are implemented. For example, a gym should be created or improved. Heating and air conditioning should be installed wherever possible. Email should be accessible. Latrines should be kept clean. Comfortable sleeping quarters should be made. These are ideas–but the overall intent would be to give soldiers as many of the comforts of home as possible.

The homefront. Taking care of families at home is paramount to a successful deployment. Because communications are prevalent between deployed troops and their families, it becomes quickly evident that if families are having problems, the unit should address these problems. When a unit deploys, a few soldiers are always left back to care for the armory and support families. These people, known as the Rear Detachment, must take their jobs very seriously and be readily accessible and available to help when needed. Additionally, a strong family readiness

group (FRG) should be established. These groups are designed to be a support structure for

families and are staffed by the spouses, parents, and "significant others" of unit members. An

active and involved FRG, combined with a dedicated team of stay-behind soldiers, will alleviate

many of the potential problems at home. When a troop knows that his or her family is taken care

of, a significant mental burden is relieved and job satisfaction is bound to improve.

Building Cohesive Teams

The Army National Guard is organized in such a manner as to make team building easy

for unit leaders. The objective of the leader is to make the individual soldier feel as though

he/she is part of something greater than him/herself. The Army and the Army Guard have long

lineage and honors bestowed upon the military units. Many Guard units trace their histories back

long before the Civil War and even the American Revolution. In fact, each year the Army Guard

celebrates its birthday on December 13, the date the Massachusetts Bay Colony formed its first

militia in 1636 (Doubler, 2002). Leaders must capitalize upon this lineage, making soldiers

understand that their service today is in a long tradition of brave men and women who have

served throughout the history of their country.

Additionally, leaders should encourage competition between their unit and other like-

sized units. Whether it is a squad, a platoon, a company, or a battalion, the respective leaders of

these units should encourage members to be better than the other. A squad leader, for example,

needs to motivate his soldiers to work together to be the best squad in the platoon and even the

best squad in the entire company. There are many ways this can be measured; from having the

best physical training, to the best marksmanship, to even having the first squad completed with

their equipment maintenance at the end of drill weekend. Squads may even get together with

families and socialize during off-drill weekends. By developing the squad or other small unit to be cohesive and instilling that unit pride and espirit de corps into the members, the unit will develop its own identity and synergistic benefits will develop.

When mobilized, units that have strong team synergies will know that the work they are doing is appreciated. They will have a strong sense of accomplishment and feel very positive about the experience. This comes from the simple fact that each member, working together, will help the unit to succeed. In combat, the positive effects of teamwork can save lives.

Team building skills also build loyalty, which is the first of the seven Army values. This value goes beyond being loyal to any individual and is nested in the unit. A loyal soldier will support the collective effort of his or her organization. The leader will, as the head of that unit, gain the loyalty of the soldiers assigned–as long as it is deserved. As soon as the troops begin to feel as though the leader is no longer willing to stand up for them and take care of them, their loyalty and the espirit de corps will deteriorate.

Guard leaders must be ever vigilant in the battle to keep the team together. They must be determined and focused, in tune with the overall sentiment of their unit. As the feeling of teamwork begins to diminish, they must be ready with their team building skills. When a leader can effectively build a team environment, he or she will be rewarded with improved retention rates because soldiers will be less apt to leave a team that functions well together.

Communicating Effectively

Leaders in the Army National Guard must be able to communicate effectively to their soldiers on different levels. They must be able to communicate, on the strategic level, the importance of the overall mission that is being conducted. This includes why the unit was

mobilized and why it was important to leave families and jobs. This message must be articulated not only to soldiers, but to family members, employers, and community leaders as well. The Guard is a community-based force whereas the active Army is not. Each guard unit represents the town in America where it comes from. These positive, strategic communications must be delivered before, during, and after a unit is deployed.

On a tactical level, Guard leaders must ensure that they keep soldiers informed of what they need to know. They must be as candid about operations, missions, and information as possible. Giving troops the requisite information to know who, what, where, when, why, and how a combat operation will be conducted is the bare minimum. Implications of the success or failure of the mission must be communicated as well. This is not always feasible because certain information may not be authorized for dissemination, but when information is not classified, it is important that Guard leaders communicate it with the troops.

Communication with family members has changed significantly with the advent of modern communication devices such as cell phones and email. Many soldiers in combat zones have daily access to these communications. Unlike any other war, family members are hearing first-hand from their loved ones what is going on. This can be good, or can be bad–depending on how much correct information is given to the soldiers themselves. Guard commanders must be proactive in communicating with families to help quell the "rumor mill" that can be generated.

As mentioned earlier, when a unit deploys, a rear detachment stays behind. The leaders' rear detachment should (and do) stay in close contact with the forward units. They need to be able to access important news and information and should articulate how the soldiers are doing as well as to be able to share positive information with family members. One possible method for

disseminating this information is by developing a communication web site. Implementation of this site would allow the most current information about the unit and its activities to be available to families. Rumors and other negative messages could be quickly corrected and replaced with the truth. Community members and employers of the soldiers should also have access to this site, allowing messages from these concerned supporters to be easily delivered as well. In order to ensure successful implementation of this web site as a viable communication channel, it must be staffed with a rear detachment soldier who is designated as the unit web master. This troop would be tasked to keep the site updated and current. National Guard Bureau Retention Branch could easily develop a template and offer the web server space for deployed units. Costs for development and hosting would be covered by the NGB.

Beyond the many modern electronic solutions, an obvious–yet seldom used–part of good communication involves the recognition of successful participation while the unit is deployed. As simple as it may sound, leaders must take the time and effort to personally thank soldiers for doing their job. In this study, only 68% of the respondents report being thanked by their leaders for a job well done. The data indicate that those who were personally thanked were more apt to report intentions to reenlist. Stressing the importance of saying "thank you" is an essential, yet fundamental strategy for increasing retention. It is one more way that leaders can communicate to their soldiers to let them know that their sacrifice is appreciated and has not gone unnoticed.

Communication is necessary to improved retention rates. That communication should be strategic (e.g., focusing the message on the community or unit as a whole) and it should be tactical (e.g., individual messages to individual soldiers or small groups). By improving communication at both of these levels, and by keeping soldiers, families, communities, and

employers as informed as possible, the negative feelings of "not having important information" will be reduced. When this happens, leaders have taken away one more reason soldiers leave the Army National Guard and replaced it with a reason to stay.

Improving Unit Morale

It is safe to assume that the level of both unit morale and individual soldier morale will ebb and flow to a certain extent. There will be high points as well as low points over the course of a deployment. For example, morale may increase when something good happens–such as a successful mission against the enemy. Similarly, when the enemy has significant success against the unit, this can cause a dip in morale. Another, less violent example could be something as simple as good news from home. This could increase the morale of a soldier and he or she could pass that news on to others and a positive lift in morale could result. The opposite is also true if bad news from home reaches the organization. These examples are simple and easy to understand yet illustrate the tenuousness of morale in a deployed unit. Commanders and other Guard leaders need to be able to monitor morale in the unit to ensure that they are implementing measures to counter negative influences and sustain the positive influences.

It was mentioned previously that there are several methods for improving morale; the body of knowledge is very wide in this research area. Numerous scholars have suggested means to motivate employees, to change the organizational climate, or to lead others to higher levels of morale. All, however, agree that morale is very important and most would contend that leadership is at the crux of morale improvement. Guard leaders need to be aware of this important fact. They have the ability, with their actions, to influence their unit's morale. Thus, they need to take responsibility for the task of improving morale.

A cynical refrain has permeated the ranks of employees in both the civilian and military sectors. It states, "The beatings will continue until morale improves." This comment, though it is meant to be tongue-in-cheek, exemplifies the way that many military commanders think. It makes sense that there are leaders in the Army National Guard who either do not care about the morale of their unit or do not believe that they can influence that morale without threat of adverse action. Additionally, there are leaders who simply are not aware that they have the ability to improve unit morale by their actions. This is why ensuring that the leaders are trained in methods to improve morale is so very important. By being aware and by getting the critical leadership skill training discussed in the next section, morale should improve and as will rates of retention.

Leadership Skill Training through Continuing Education

Soldiers are trained in leadership behavior that is based on the leadership doctrine, FM 22-100. This training is typically very good and highly applicable to leading soldiers. The doctrine is based in Mumford's leadership skills theory and, based upon the results of this study, Guard leaders should know the skills contained in that theory and in the doctrine in order to improve retention rates. One of the tenants of leadership skills theory is the need for continuing leader development.

Developing leadership skills should be an academic as well as practical pursuit. Certainly, Guard leaders get the opportunity to practice their leadership skills often, but there is little formalize leadership training outside of the current Army education system–a system developed specifically for Active Component personnel. There are specific issues that Guard

leaders must be concerned about with regard to leadership, and through a comprehensive training program, the organization may experience significant benefits.

Another problem with the way the Army academically develops its leaders is that although NCOs get quality, doctrine-based leadership training throughout their careers, officers typically do not get to experience quality leadership training past the grade of captain. Captains in the Army are junior officers. Significant steps to improve the leadership skills of higher-ranking personnel is important.

It is recommended that the Army National Guard develop a system of continuing education in leadership and require its leaders to amass annual credits to remain current in their profession. Much of this training could be conducted online, but it could also be conducted at weekend seminars. Similar to medical professionals who are required to stay current in their field, those who have chosen the profession of arms and selected the ARNG as their service component would be required to get specialized training in leadership. With regard to retaining their soldiers, this training could consist of those skills shown in this study related to job satisfaction, team building, communication, and morale building.

Job satisfaction training. It has been shown that there is a relationship between job satisfaction and retention. As satisfaction increases, so does the propensity to reenlist. Therefore, Guard leaders must learn tactics, techniques, and procedures that will help them to improve job satisfaction within their units. For example, this training should include an understanding of motivational theory such as Hertzberg's two-factor theory. Leaders must be able to recognize the opportunities to motivate, thereby improving overall job satisfaction. By using these positive techniques, retention may very well be significantly increased.

Team building training. Team building skills must be developed among Guard leaders. Often it is the perception of young soldiers that their leaders are only interested in themselves and are not focused on the success of the team. Military leaders need to be conscious of the image that they are portraying at all times. National Guard soldiers are very perceptive and will quickly see through a self-interested leader. This study revealed that many respondents believe their officers more concerned about promotion than about the welfare of their units. This could be a very unfair assessment of the officers, but it is very important that officers are aware that this perception exists. The problem is that many officers do not know how to overcome negative personal image perceptions. This is one area of team building that could be trained in the leadership education program. Other suggestions would be to develop friendly competition between squads or platoons or encouraging socializing outside of drill weekend. Many things could be trained, but the most important recommendation is that a formal education program is established and that team-building skills are contained in the curriculum.

Communication training. One of the interesting things about communication is that it is instantaneous. Therefore, improvements in communication will be felt immediately and may have swift and positive effects. If the Guard were to implement a program of continuing education that included modules on improving communication skills of Guard leaders, this could be one of the quickest methods for improving retention, and it could have a long-term impact.

As suggested with job satisfaction and team building, many specific classes could be offered. Communication, however, should be focused on the audiences that Guard leaders must deal with most regularly. Therefore, this communication training should target four core audiences: soldiers, families, employers, and the local community. The *soldiers* aspect of the

training should educate leaders on how to keep troops informed about wartime operations, including both good and bad news. Soldiers crave information and get frustrated when information is withheld for reasons they consider inappropriate. The techniques to improve this and other soldier communication–during both wartime and peacetime–should be trained to Guard leaders. The training to communicate with *families* should focus on a consistent two-way flow of communication between the unit and the family members. The training should also focus on rumor control and the criticality of ensuring that families know as much of the truth about what is happening with their soldiers as is feasible without divulging classified information. *Employers* require knowledge that their employee is doing well but also need to know when to expect that person back at work. They should be able to access unit calendars and know what training must be conducted. Employers should be told about leave policy for returning Guard members and have a general understanding of the psychological effects of war. Unit leaders should be up-front and honest with employers, ensuring that the most accurate, up-to-date information is posted and communicated. *Communities* are an often overlooked audience that unit leaders communicate with. There is a vast support network of business, religious, and social organizations that will be willing and, in fact, excited to help their local "heroes" if they only were informed of what to do. Guard leaders, both deployed and in the rear, must remember to continuously keep their local communities informed and involved.

Morale training. The literature on morale is based in ethics, organizational culture and climate, as well as leadership. Each of these areas plays a role in improving morale and would be integrated among programs to train unit leaders on those tactics, techniques, and procedures for this important leadership skill. High morale in a unit is paramount to success on and off the field

of battle. It is also important in ensuring that retention rates are consistently high. In a traditional

Guard unit, one that is training one weekend per month, leaders have very limited time to affect

morale. Problems are exacerbated over time, therefore, it is important for leaders to hone their

morale building skills and be able to quickly recognize signs of lowered unit morale and defuse

the situation effectively. This is one of many possible ideas of how to focus the leadership skill

training to improve morale. A full curriculum could and should be developed to offer many more

tactics, techniques and procedures that Guard leaders can implement.

Summary. Training Army National Guard leaders in these relevant leadership skills will

help to increase the overall retention in the organization. The difficulty will be in gaining the

acceptance from Guard members because the concept is to make training mandatory. The Army

National Guard will need to make this change somewhat palatable to its soldiers. This can be

done by developing innovative and interesting courses directed to the specific level of leadership

being addressed. In other words, squad leaders and battalion commanders will have targeted

courses that are developed for their own skill levels. The delivery method and ease of

accessibility to the classes will also make a difference. Online delivery is one good option, as are

exportable training packages. Organized seminars at desirable locations should be considered as

well. Given the right mix of instruction, content, and delivery, the leadership-training program

has potential to be successful and accepted by the organization.

<center>Recommendation for Future Research</center>

This study covers 2 ½ years of data and was captured when soldiers returned home from

a mobilization. A future study that would be helpful in determining the long-term effects of

leadership skills on retention rates is to gather data each year from soldiers who had deployed. A longitudinal study of this nature would provide interesting insights, particularly when compared to baseline retention rates for a given unit.

If the leadership skills training program recommended in this study were to be implemented, it would be fruitful to measure its effectiveness. Initially, it would be beneficial to determine the diffusion of the program to Guard units nationwide. Researchers could then assess the success of these changes with regard to retention as well as other areas affected by leadership skills. Once pre- and post-implementation data are obtained, comparisons can be made from these analyses, further adjustments to the leadership skills training program can be made.

Closing Comments

Retention in the Army National Guard (ARNG) is critical to the security of this nation. The Guard conducts operations that are both humanitarian and combat–both foreign and domestically–on a daily basis. Retaining quality soldiers must be a significant focus of the service over the next several years. Without leadership emphasis, retention rates will drop. Further, without the development of key leadership skills, retention rates will suffer. The author acknowledges that there are many factors associated with a soldier's decision to reenlist and that this decision is intensely personal. It is exactly the personal nature of this decision that makes the results of this study so relevant. Unit leaders must understand the importance of enhancing those relationships through implementation of the learned leadership skills in this study. Through judicious use of effective leadership skills, these commanders can positively affect the retention

problem from within. By adjusting its leadership-training program, the ARNG may find itself

reaping retention rewards for years to come.

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APPENDIX A

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD POST-MOBILIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Welcome home! Your recent deployed service is appreciated. This questionnaire is designed to obtain information about how your deployment went, how you feel about a number of issues, and how the deployment experience might affect how you feel about continuing your Army National Guard service.

You should have been provided with a number 2 pencil and a mark-sense answer sheet. You should also have been given a Unit Code (something like ARAAD). Do NOT put your name in the name block on the answer sheet. Instead, fill in the bubbles that match the Unit Code you were given. Then start with question 1 on the answer sheet. Use ONLY a number 2 pencil to mark your responses. Some questions ask you to choose only one response from a list of responses. It some cases, you might feel that you want to select more than one response, but PLEASE DO NOT mark more than one response on any question.

1. What is your age today?

   A. 17-20
   B. 21-24
   C. 25-28
   D. 29-32
   E. 33-36
   F. 37-40
   G. 41-44
   H. 45+

2. What is your sex?

   A. Male
   B. Female

3. What best describes your race or ethnic background?

   A. American Indian
   B. American Indian (Hispanic)
   C. Asian or Pacific Islander
   D. Asian or Pacific Islander (Hispanic)
   E. Black
   F. Black (Hispanic)
   G. White
   H. White (Hispanic)

I. Other

4. What is your marital status?

   A. Married
   B. Single
   C. Divorced
   D. Separated
   E. Getting legally separated or divorced (NOT as a direct result of the mobilization)
   F. Getting legally separated or divorced (AS a DIRECT RESULT of the mobilization)

5. Do you have children 18 years old or younger?

   A. Yes
   B. No

6. Please complete the following sentence. Prior to being mobilized, I was an M-Day soldier and in addition I...

   A. Worked full time in a civilian job
   B. Worked 1 or more part time civilian jobs
   C. Was a student (also working part or full time)
   D. Was a full time student (not working)
   E. NA, I worked full time for the Guard, was ADSW, AGR, or Mil Tech
   F. NA, I had no other employment

7. Before you mobilized, was your employment...

   A. Full time Guard (ADSW, AGR, or Mil Tech)
   B. Law Enforcement
   C. Blue collar (private firm)
   D. Blue collar (Fed, State, Local Gvt.)
   E. White collar (private firm)
   F. White collar (Fed, State, Local Gvt.)
   G. Farmer, rancher
   H. Self-employed
   I. Only paid employment was as a drilling reservist

8. What best describes your military experience at the time you joined the Guard? Please tell us if you had no prior military experience or, you had served in the active Army or another service, or participated in reserve service other than ARNG.

   A. Civilian with no previous military experience
   B. Had been on active duty in the Army

C. Had been on active duty with another service
D. Had been in the Army Reserve or another reserve component

9. How many years (total) have you been in the Guard?

A. Less than 3 years
B. At least 3 years but less than 6 years
C. At least 6 years but less than 9 years
D. At least 9 years but less than 12 years
E. At least 12 years but less than 15 years
F. At least 15 years but less than 18 years
G. At least 18 years or more

10. What is your current pay grade?

A. E1-E2
B. E3-E4
C. E5-E6
D. E7-E9
E. O1-O2
F. O3-O4
G. O5-O6
H. WO1-WO5

11. Do you feel that the mobilization (indirectly or directly) had an effect on your being promoted/not being promoted to the next pay grade? Please complete the sentence "Mobilization has...

A. NOT affected my being promoted/not being promoted to the next pay grade
B. Helped my chances of being promoted to the next pay grade
C. Hurt my chances for being promoted because it delayed my civilian education requirement
D. Hurt my chances for being promoted for other reasons
E. Made me not want to be promoted to the next pay grade

12. Please choose the correct statement regarding voluntary or involuntary mobilization, with your unit or another unit:

A. I voluntarily mobilized with my entire unit
B. I voluntarily mobilized with many soldiers from my unit
C. I voluntarily mobilized with another unit (very few or no soldiers from my unit)
D. I was involuntarily mobilized with my entire unit
E. I was involuntarily mobilized with many soldiers from my unit
F. I was involuntarily mobilized with another unit (very few or no soldiers from my unit)

13. This question asks if a State Active Duty (SAD) mobilization provided you with lower pay, or fewer benefits, than if you were federally activated during mobilization.

    A. NA, I was not State Active Duty (SAD) for any part of this mobilization
    B. I was SAD but I don't know what the difference in pay/benefits is
    C. SAD resulted in less pay/fewer benefits than federal activation
    D. SAD resulted in the same pay/benefits a federal activation would have
    E. SAD resulted in more pay/benefits than federal activation would have

14. How many days were you mobilized? (during your last mobilization)

    A. 1- 15
    B. 16-30
    C. 31-60
    D. 61-90
    E. 91-120
    F. 121-180
    G. 181-240
    H. 241-300
    I. 301-360
    J. More than 360 days

15. Was this mobilization categorized as:

    A. Overseas (other than training)
    B. Homeland security (CONUS)
    C. Training (CONUS)
    D. Training (overseas)
    E. Other/Don't know

16. How many days (total) have you been mobilized in the past two years?

    A. 1-15
    B. 16-30
    C. 31-60
    D. 61-90
    E. 91-120
    F. 121-180
    G. 181-240
    H. 241-300
    I. 301-360
    J. More than 360 days

17. Please select the one statement that best describes the main reason you joined the Guard.

A. Education: GI Bill, Student Loan Repayment, State Benefits, etc.
B. Additional Cash Income
C. Retirement program
D. Skill training/vocational training
E. Excitement and adventure
F. Serve my community and country
G. Camaraderie, belonging, mission accomplishment
H. Full time employment in the Guard (ADSW, AGR, Mil Tech)

18. Which one statement best describes the main reason you were still in the Guard just prior to being mobilized?

A. Using educational benefits
B. Needed the monthly income
C. Retirement benefits
D. Getting good job training
E. Enjoyed the excitement and challenge
F. Personal sense of fulfillment
G. Sense of belonging
H. Full time employment in the Guard (ADSW, AGR, Mil Tech)
I. Military service obligation or Stop Loss

19. This question asks you to think back to BEFORE you mobilized, and tell us which statement best described what you intended to do at the end of your current enlistment or military service obligation?

A. Retire as soon as possible
B. Stay in the Guard until I eventually retire
C. Reenlist or extend
D. Did not intend to reenlist or extend, but planned on completing my enlistment/MSO
E. Was thinking about getting out sooner than my ETS or MSO
F. Was going to get out prior to my ETS or MSO

20. This question asks you how you feel NOW. Having just returned from the mobilization, which statement now best describes what you intend to do at the end of your current enlistment or military service obligation?

A. Will retire as soon as possible
B. Will stay in the Guard until I eventually retire
C. Will reenlist or extend
D. I do not intend to reenlist or extend, but plan on completing my enlistment/MSO
E. I am thinking about getting out sooner than my ETS or MSO
F. I know I will get out prior to my ETS or MSO

21. This question asks you about STOP LOSS. If you are currently under a stop loss order, and stop loss lifted tomorrow, would you...

    A. NA, I am not currently under a stop loss order
    B. Retire as soon as possible
    C. Stay in the Guard until I eventually retire
    D. Reenlist or extend
    E. Complete my enlistment/MSO and leave
    F. Think about getting out sooner than ETS or MSO
    G. Get out of the ARNG prior to ETS or MSO

22. Many questions in this survey ask about negative impacts of mobilization. Although you may want to choose more than one of the responses below, in this question we need you to select the ONE response that troubled you MOST about mobilization.

    A. Loss of income/financial pressures
    B. Incorrect or late pay
    C. Problems with my civilian career plans/employer
    D. Problems completing my civilian education
    E. Time away from my spouse/family/significant other
    F. Medical/Stress (problems or lack of treatment for myself/my family)
    G. Inadequate training or equipment
    H. Lack of thanks/recognition for my service
    I. Poor leadership
    J. Inadequate information or communication

23. Are you thinking of leaving the Guard/leaving earlier than you had originally planned, because of your answer to the previous question?

    A. Yes
    B. No
    C. Unsure
    D. Thinking of leaving the Guard but NOT because of mobilization related trouble/issues

24. If your income dropped, you lost money, had additional expenses, or you experienced financial problems due to the mobilization, choose the ONE biggest reason from the list below:

    A. NA, mobilization caused little or no financial problems, extra expense, or money loss for me
    B. My military pay was late or incorrect
    C. My military pay was correct but lower than my civilian pay
    D. I was not reimbursed as I should have been for expenses during the mobilization

E. Spouse's employment negatively affected by my being mobilized and/or I had childcare   expenses that I did not have before mobilization

F. I was enrolled in (civilian) school and could not get a refund on tuition paid
G. I had legal expenses, new bills, or finance charges as a result of the mobilization
H. I lost retirement time/money/benefits while being mobilized

25. Please choose the correct answer to complete the sentence: "Due to mobilizing, my income..."

A. Went down (I lost money)
B. Went up (I made money)
C. Was unchanged (Income stayed about the same)

26. If your income went down, you lost money, or you feel you aren't going to be reimbursed for necessary expenses due to mobilizing, what was the dollar amount that you feel you lost?

A. I do not feel that I lost money because of the mobilization
B. Lost less than $ 500
C. Lost at least $ 500 but less than $ 2,500
D. Lost at least $ 2,500 but less than $ 5,000
E. Lost at least $ 5,000 but less than $ 10,000
F. Lost at least $ 10,000 but less than $ 15,000
G. Lost at least $ 15,000 but less than $ 20,000
H. Lost $ 20,000 or more

27. Complete the sentence "If I were Director of the ARNG, the FIRST thing I would do to help the FAMILY of a mobilized soldier would be to...

A. NA, no family or no help needed
B. Keep them well informed of mob/de-mob dates and schedules, and soldier contact information

C. Keep them well informed of soldier mission and safety and provide better "rumor control" (ease worrying) during mobilization

D. Provide better medical/dental support and information
E. Provide better emotional support and/or counseling for spouses and children during mobilization

F. Provide necessary financial assistance

28. What would be the best way for the Guard to provide your family with information on mobilization, de-mob, emergency contacts, and other important information?

A. At briefings or Family Readiness Meetings held at your drill site

B. At a web site on the internet and/or by e-mail
C. On a video tape
D. Mailing the information to your home
E. Other
F. NA, does not apply to me

29. Complete the sentence "If I were Director of the ARNG, the FIRST thing I would do to help mobilized SOLDIERS would be to...

A. Provide accurate up-to-date pre-mob and mob information
B. Improve medical, dental, emotional support/access during mobilization
   C. Make sure leadership "stands up" for the troops and takes an active role in maintaining morale

D. Improve equipment and training for the mission
E. Make sure pay is correct and on time
   F. Maintain contact with civilian employers to ensure soldier's job and benefits are maintained during and after mobilization

   G. Provide financial assistance or compensation to those whose income goes down or who incur out-of-pocket expenses

H. Reimburse tuition and give time to complete college education

30. Did stress related to the mobilization cause a problem with alcohol or drug use for yourself, your family, or another soldier you know?

A. No or NA
B. Yes, for myself
C. Yes, for myself and another family member(s)
D. Yes, for myself and another soldier(s)
E. Yes, for my family member(s)
F. Yes, for another soldier

31. If you feel you experienced very serious negative consequences in your personal life due to the mobilization, please indicate ONE area most seriously affected from the list below. If no serious consequences, select the last response "NA/No."

A. Job or Career
B. Financial
C. Legal
D. Education/College
E. Spouse or significant other (relationship)
F. Child/children
G. Physical health
H. Stress, substance abuse, or depression

I. Other
J. NA/No very serious negative consequences

32. How do frequent mobilizations (more than one within 24 months) or the possibility of frequent mobilizations affect your ARNG retention or future plans to continue drilling?

A. No effect at all on my retention
B. Positive, still plan to continue my ARNG membership
C. Negative, frequent mobilization makes me want to get out of the ARNG
D. Unsure, it would depend on the length/nature of the mobilization

33. Did someone in the chain of command personally thank you for doing a good job during the mobilization?

A. Yes
B. No

34. Did you develop medical or stress related problems as a result of the mobilization?

A. Yes
B. No

The rest of the questions ask you how strongly you agree or disagree with a statement. Please read each statement, then select:
A—If you STRONGLY DISAGREE with the statement
B—if you just disagree with the statement
C—If the statement is not applicable to you or you feel neutral about it
D—if you agree with the statement
E—if you STRONGLY AGREE with the statement

35. My employer has been very supportive of my Guard membership and mobilization.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

36. Before I mobilized, my family obtained military ID cards for medical and commissary benefits without any difficulty.

A. Strongly Disagree

B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

37. My spouse or family is much more negative toward my Guard membership because of my being mobilized.

  A. Strongly Disagree
  B. Disagree
  C. Not Applicable/Neutral
  D. Agree
  E. Strongly Agree

38. Changing mob and de-mob dates caused me/my family a great deal of stress.

  A. Strongly Disagree
  B. Disagree
  C. Not Applicable/Neutral
  D. Agree
  E. Strongly Agree

39. Officer leadership during the mobilization had a very positive effect on the unit's morale.

  A. Strongly Disagree
  B. Disagree
  C. Not Applicable/Neutral
  D. Agree
  E. Strongly Agree

40. I feel that my State appreciated my service during the mobilization.

  A. Strongly Disagree
  B. Disagree
  C. Not Applicable/Neutral
  D. Agree
  E. Strongly Agree

41. I feel that overall, mobilization was a very positive experience for me.

  A. Strongly Disagree
  B. Disagree
  C. Not Applicable/Neutral
  D. Agree

E. Strongly Agree

42. During the mobilization, Officer leadership was more interested in moving to the next pay grade than taking care of the troops.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

43. I felt Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) was adequate during the mobilization.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

44. I feel that my family was well cared for by my unit's Family Readiness Program.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

45. I believe that my child's mood, behavior, or grades suffered because of the mobilization.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

46. My family had adequate medical support during the mobilization.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

47. Medical and emotional support (Chaplain or counseling) was available to those SOLDIERS who needed it during the mobilization.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

48. I felt a sense of accomplishment in completing my mobilization mission.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

49. I had the appropriate training I needed to perform my mission safely.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

50. I had the appropriate equipment I needed to perform my mission safely.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

51. Lodging/billeting was adequate based on my duty.

   A. Strongly Disagree
   B. Disagree
   C. Not Applicable/Neutral
   D. Agree
   E. Strongly Agree

52. It was difficult getting nutritious meals or getting meals in a timely manner.

   A. Strongly Disagree

B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

53. Unit morale was a big problem throughout the mobilization.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

54. I was adequately kept informed about my mission during the mobilization.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

55. I was paid accurately.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

56. I was paid in a timely manner.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

57. My spouse or family understood why I needed to serve/participate in this mobilization.

A. Strongly Disagree
B. Disagree
C. Not Applicable/Neutral
D. Agree
E. Strongly Agree

58. The ARNG provided good information to my family (how to contact me in an emergency, what my unit was doing, the importance of the mission, and conditions at mobilization location.)

    A. Strongly Disagree
    B. Disagree
    C. Not Applicable/Neutral
    D. Agree
    E. Strongly Agree

59. I received my mobilization orders in a timely manner, allowing me to make the appropriate arrangements and notifications.

    A. Strongly Disagree
    B. Disagree
    C. Not Applicable/Neutral
    D. Agree
    E. Strongly Agree

60. NCO leadership during the mob had a very positive effect on the unit's morale.

    A. Strongly Disagree
    B. Disagree
    C. Not Applicable/Neutral
    D. Agree
    E. Strongly Agree

Thank you for your participation in this survey, and for your service to your country!

APPENDIX B

ADMINISTRATION PROCESS

The following instructions will help you administer the Post-Mobilization Survey to soldiers returning from their mobilizations, either at the de-mobilization station or at the unit armory after they return.

If you have any questions, or need help, please call █████████ *We will be happy to help walk you through the process!*

There are 6 easy steps to successfully administering this survey:

1. *Prepare* for the survey.
2. *Create* survey key codes.
3. *Administer* the survey.
4. *Scan* the questionnaires.
5. *Upload* the data.
6. *Review* the results.

If you intend for soldiers to take the survey on-line, follow steps 1 (paper answersheets, surveys and pencils are not needed) and 2 first.
Provide the survey key code which you created in step 2 to all the soldiers.
Have them come to this web-site and click on the link: Click Here to Participate in the Study
They must have the survey keycode to proceed. The online survey will appear as soon as the keycode is submitted.

Prepare for the survey:

1. *Coordinate.*   Contact the OIC/NCOIC at the demobilization site (or the armory) to arrange for 30-45 minutes to administer the survey.

2. *Get your supplies.*

a. Answer Sheets: Have enough answer sheets (one for each soldier that's returning, plus a few extras). Note: You must use the NCS© General Purpose Answer Sheet # 4887. These are the same answer sheets used for the SMAM surveys.

Note: Click here for a link to NCS Pearson if you need to order answer sheets or call NCS Pearson at 1-800-367-6627 (Ask for GSA pricing on GP Answer Sheet # 4887).

Warning!   You must use *original* answer sheets. Copies will *not* scan, and are a violation of NCS copyright.

b. Number 2 Pencils: Have enough sharpened number 2 pencils (one for each soldier, plus a few extras).

Warning!   Anything other than a Number 2 pencil will <u>not</u> *scan*.

c. Questionnaires: Have enough questionnaires printed (one for each soldier, plus a few extras).

Note: Click <u>here</u> to get the questionnaire.

3. *Identify the units.* Know what units will be there. Get the UIC and Unit Description for each unit.

Note:

- o a. The UIC is the Unit Identification Code. It is a six-character code that looks like this: *WXDUAA* .
- o b. The Unit Description is the unit's name. Example: *144th MP Co (Cbt Spt)*.
- o c.   In some cases, there may be several units demobilizing together.
- o d. Units from different states might be processing together.

Create survey key codes:

1. *If you will have one or more company-sized units together as <u>units</u>:*

a.   Click on *Create a Survey Key Code* on this web-site.

b.   For *each* unit that will be demobilizing, click on the state, and find the UIC/Description for the unit. Click on *Submit*.

Note: If you can't find the UIC/Description in the list box, check the box *Add Unit to Database*. Enter a UIC and description, then click on *Submit*.

c.   You will be provided with a Survey Key Code. The Survey Key Code is a five-letter code, the first 2 letters of which are the unit's state. It looks something like: MIAEL

Important!   Write the Survey Key Code down, or print the web page.
Warning! The Survey Key Code *must* be used during the administration of the questionnaire. It is also used by soldiers who may complete the questionnaire on-line. It is used to identify the unit in the database.

2. *If there will be a "gaggle" of soldiers from mixed units/states processing together:*

For the 1st CONUSA: Use Survey Key Code: *FKAAE*
For the 5th CONUSA: Use Survey Key Code: *FKAAF*

Note: This might happen at demob sites if there is a large influx of soldiers.

Administer the survey:

1. *Arrive* Early.   Get to the demob station/armory in plenty of time with enough answer sheets and number 2 pencils.

2. *Follow* the Script.   When it is time to administer the survey, *follow the script* provided to explain the purpose of the questionnaire, and the use of the Survey Key Code on the answer sheet. Click here to view the script.

Warning! It is *critical* that you do *not* hand out the answer sheets until you have provided the instructions in the script to the respondents.

3. *Manage* the answer sheets as they are turned in.   It depends on how the soldiers are being processed:

a. *One or more units in unit sets from the same state.* Try to keep the answer sheets from each *unit* separate as they are turned in.

Tip: Rubber band the sets from each unit together and label the batch with the unit's UIC/Description.

b. *One or more units in unit sets from different states.* You *must keep the answer sheets from each state together as a batch.*

Note: You should also keep each unit together as a batch, if possible.

c. A "gaggle" of soldiers from one or more states. Just keep the answer sheets together for scanning.

IMPORTANT! It is critical that soldiers completely and accurately enter the Survey Key Code on their questionnaires.

Scan the questionnaires:

1. Scan the answer sheets using the NCS Opscan® scanner (the same scanner that is used for SMAM surveys). Tip: Try to keep the answer sheets from each unit together and scan them into a single data file.   Give the data file a name that you can recognize belongs to the unit.

Note: If you have completed questionnaires but do not have access to a scanner, call 1-888-893-1684 for assistance.

Upload the data:

1. *If you have data from one or more company-sized units from one or more states:*

a. Click on *Upload Data* on this web-site.

c. *For each data file:*

> 1. Identify the state the unit belongs to by *Clicking* on the state in the list box.
> 2. *Click on* the *Browse* button to locate the data file on diskette or on the computer.
> 3. *Click on* the *Submit* button to upload the data to the database.

2. *If you have data from a "gaggle" of soldiers from mixed units/states:*

a. Click on *Upload Data* on this web-site.

b. *For each data file:*

> 1. Click on the <u>*State of "Franklin"*</u> in the state list box. (Note: This is a fictitious state used to hold mixed data from CONUSAs.)
> 2. *Click on* the *Browse* button to locate the data file on diskette or on the computer.
> 3. *Click on* the *Submit* button to upload the data to the database.

Review the results:

1. Click on *View Results for a Survey* on this web-site.

2. Identify the state by *Clicking* on the state in the list box.

Note: To review data from one of the CONUSA's, click on *Franklin*.

3. View the results of each question.

   If you need more help, please call ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮. Someone will be at that number during business hours (0900-1700 M-F Eastern Time). We will be happy to help walk you through the entire process!

APPENDIX C

<div align="center">Script</div>

Use this Script when you administer the questionnaire.

If you follow the script below, the administration of the Post-Mob survey should go smoothly for you.

Click here for complete instructions.

Very Important! Read this script to soldiers before handing out answer sheets!

"Welcome home! I am ___(Rank/Name)___, of ___(Organization)___.

I am here on behalf of the Strength Maintenance Division at National Guard Bureau. With the high pace of deployments and other activity in the National Guard, leadership at National Guard Bureau wants to know how this pace might affect the long-term strength and readiness of the Guard.

They have established a Post-Mobilization questionnaire to obtain information from every Army National Guard soldier who returns from deployment.   This questionnaire was developed based on discussions with soldiers who have mobilized before you. The questionnaire asks about how your deployment went, your views on leadership, family issues, and a number of other factors, including how the mobilization might impact on your decision to stay in the Guard.

The results of these questionnaires will be used to try to improve the deployment experience of soldiers in the future, as well as their families.

Your views are important! Please answer each question as honestly as you can. This survey does *not* ask for your name, and this is your chance to sound off, so please take advantage of it.

I have a few administrative things to go over now, so please listen up.

 (*Hold up a blank answer sheet with the front side facing the group*)

This is a the answer sheet you will be using. At the top of the front side is a set of response bubbles that say *Name*. *Don't put your name there!* Instead, I'm going to give you some letters to put there. It's called a Survey Key Code. Please fill in the bubbles for the Survey Key Code in the Name block."

> *(IMPORTANT! It is critical that soldiers completely and accurately enter the Survey Key Code on their questionnaires! Please stress this with the soldiers.)*

If there is one Unit:

"The Survey Key Code for your unit is: ____Survey Key Code____"

 If there is more than one unit:

"If you are in ____(Unit)____, the Survey Key Code for your unit is: ____Survey Key Code____

If you are in ____(Unit)____, the Survey Key Code for your unit is: ____Survey Key Code____"

If there is a *"gaggle"* of soldiers demobilizing together from different units & states:

"The Survey Key Code is: ____Survey Key Code for 1st CONUSA or 5th CONUSA____"

Note: If you can, write the Survey Key Code on a chalkboard, white board, or in large letters on a sheet of paper so soldiers can see it when they get their answer sheets.

"Once you have filled in the Survey Key Code, then start with question one from the questionnaire. (*Point to where question one is on the answer sheet you are holding*). There are sixty questions in the survey, and it should only take you a few minutes to complete. When you are done, please bring your questionnaire and your completed answer sheet to me, and place it here." (*Show them where you want it*)

If there is more than one unit:

"If you are in ____(Unit)____, please place your answer sheet here. (*Show them*)"

"If you are in ____(Unit)____, please place your answer sheet here. (*Show them*)"

"Please use only a number 2 pencil. Ink or anything else won't scan and we won't get your views. Also, select only *one* response for each question. You've all used these kind of answer sheets before, so fill in the bubble all the way, and if you need to make a change, erase completely before you change your response. Are there any questions?"

(*Get some volunteers to help hand out answer sheets and pencils*)

"You can begin when you get your answer sheet and pencil.   Again, welcome home, and thanks for your input. It *will* make a difference."

(*As soldiers return their answer sheets, get the questionnaires and pencils back for re-use.*)

(*Important! Keep the answer sheets from each unit together if at all possible*.)

(*When you're all done, gather up the materials and take them to where the scanner is located for processing*)